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The military health care system has been plagued by increasing health care costs 
for the past few decades.  The military has implemented a couple of programs in an effort 
to control costs while maintaining quality health care for beneficiaries.  The CHAMPUS 
program was DoD’s first attempt to allow beneficiaries to receive care from civilian 
physicians for a small fee.  This program was replaced with the Tricare program which 
offered a three option health plan and provided easy access to medical care for 
beneficiaries, but it failed to control costs.  This project initially attempted to demonstrate 
that by increasing cost shares to beneficiaries associated with the Tricare program, 
greater efficiency and cost savings in the military health care system could be achieved.  
While unable to prove this, we found evidence of self-selection occurring among Tricare 
Standard enrollees.  Standard enrollees are using inpatient and outpatient care at higher 
rates than their Prime counterparts.  Analysis of this self-selection could have 
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A. THE MILITARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
 
1. Military Health Care System Overview 
The military health care system provides medical services in order to maintain the 
operational readiness of the United States’ armed forces.  The military health care system 
is designed to provide two missions: readiness and benefits.  The readiness mission is 
focused on providing medical services for military personnel injured in combat as well as 
preventative care for maintaining a force ready to fight.  The other mission of the health 
care system also occurs during times of war and peace, but it includes a significantly 
larger population.  The benefits mission uses the same staff as the readiness mission but 
adds the responsibility to care for dependents of active duty personnel, retirees and their 
dependents, and dependents of deceased members.  The Department of Defense (DoD) 
recognizes that the benefits mission adds stress to the health care system, but believes 
that offering peacetime care provides a valuable benefit for personnel that aids recruiting 
and retention efforts.  It also allows medical personnel in military hospitals the 
opportunity for training through diagnosing and treating a broad range of patient 
conditions. 
During the Cold War, the capacity of military treatments facilities (MTFs) could 
not meet the requirements of both missions.  MTFs were the only facilities available for 
active duty personnel and other eligible beneficiaries to get free medical service.  Since 
care was free and capacity could not keep up with demand, a system had to be developed 
to ensure active duty members received the care required to meet the readiness mission of 
the military while also providing the benefits mission of providing care to beneficiaries.  
To address the issue of high demand the MTFs implemented a priority system consisting 
of three tiers.  The first tier was for active duty personnel; this meant their medical needs 
were satisfied before the needs of lower tier personnel.  The second tier was for the 
dependents of active duty personnel and this group received care after first tier members.  
The third tier was for retirees, their dependents and survivors, and they could be seen 
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only after first and second tier customer’s demands were satisfied.  Second and third tier 
customers had access to the same quality care; however, they experienced long wait times 
and sometimes were turned away without receiving care due to MTFs operating at full 
capacity.  DoD recognized this situation as a problem and it was addressed by Congress 
in 1966 with the creation of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
Services (CHAMPUS).  The intent was to reduce the strain on MTF capacity while 
providing access to quality care for second and third tier customers. 
CHAMPUS survived for 30 years and at the end of the Cold War DoD 
reexamined its medical infrastructure to combat rising health care costs and growing 
beneficiary populations.  The result was an end to the CHAMPUS era of health care 
management and the birth of a new health care program.  The Tricare program was born 
out of a study mandated by the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993.  This Act required DoD to review its wartime and peacetime medical requirements. 
 
2. CHAMPUS and Tricare Overview 
CHAMPUS was implemented as a fee-for-service (FFS) insurance program.  This 
program provided additional medical care coverage from civilian sources to dependents 
of active duty personnel, retirees, and their dependents.  It also improved access to care 
by allowing second and third tier members to avoid long wait times while accessing care.  
CHAMPUS also added additional benefits to include outpatient care and prescription 
drugs.  In order to use CHAMPUS, members had to meet certain criteria before they 
could use private sector physicians under the program.  If beneficiaries resided within an 
area serviced by a military hospital, the members had to receive written authorization 
from local hospital commanders to use CHAMPUS.  These authorizations acknowledged 
that the required care could not be provided in the regional military facilities, either due 
to the facilities being too busy to provide the service or due to the service not being 
available.  Use of CHAMPUS provided greater flexibility for DoD and its beneficiaries, 
but it came with added costs to its members.  Unlike care at MTFs, there were fees 
associated with using CHAMPUS, but the fees were not as high as in most civilian plans.  
 3
The CHAMPUS era came to a close, however, as a result of the end of the Cold War and 
the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1992 and 1993.   
The National Defense Authorization Acts of 1992 and 1993 called for DoD to 
reevaluate its wartime and peacetime health care requirements.  These evaluations were 
carried out through the 733 Study.  The outcome from the recommendations provided by 
the study created a new health care program for DoD called Tricare.  The Tricare 
program is a health care benefit entitlement program that contains option packages 
designed similar to Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) currently in use in the 
private sector.  Tricare provides three options to the beneficiary: Tricare Prime, Tricare 
Standard and Tricare Extra.  Tricare Prime is a managed care option similar to private 
sector HMOs and usually care is provided in a military facility.  Prime is the only option 
available for tier one personnel.  Tricare Standard is an option that provides the family 
member flexibility to visit any physician of his choice, but carries a higher cost burden 
for the user.  Tricare Standard is the old CHAMPUS program that has been renamed 
under the Tricare Program umbrella and remains a FFS plan.  Tricare Extra is an option 
to the Standard plan but gives the beneficiary discounts on his cost shares for using 
authorized in-network providers.  There are rules for eligibility for each option and these 
criteria are discussed in detail in a later chapter. 
The Tricare program has other components such as Point of Service (POS) and 
Tricare for Life.  POS is a fee imposed for using medical care that is not authorized under 
the Tricare option plans.  The Tricare for Life program is a supplemental medical benefit 
for retirees who are eligible for Medicare.  These aspects are also discussed further in a 
later chapter. 
Management of the Tricare program is segmented into several overseas regions 
and three separate regional territories in the Continental United States (CONUS): North, 
South, and West.  In CONUS, each segment territory is managed by a separate civilian 
HMO.  This arrangement provides some efficiency in the administration of the overall 




not managed by HMO firms.  Instead it is managed by a network of CHAMPUS claims 
processors.  Program options and eligibility rules for overseas locations remain the same 
as the CONUS programs. 
 
3. The Problem 
Historic and current practices by the military health care system and its health 
insurance supplement provide an overwhelming incentive to beneficiaries to seek medical 
care.  Medical care at military facilities is still free to all beneficiaries and Tricare Prime 
enrollees.  These members pay no insurance premiums for their coverage; nor are they 
responsible for co-payments or deductibles.  Since there is no cost to a beneficiary, free 
health care service can be utilized as much as possible in both quality and quantity.  This 
incentive creates a large demand for expensive medical service.  This high demand is 
driving up military health care costs and consuming a larger percentage of DoD’s annual 
budget.  To combat this problem, DoD should develop a policy that maintains access to 
quality medical care for all beneficiaries, but also provides an incentive for beneficiaries 
to make an educated decision on the amount of health care they demand. 
 
B. OBJECTIVES  
 
The initial objective of this project was to recommend a policy for DoD that 
would provide an incentive for beneficiaries to make an educated decision on medical 
care.  The proposed policy would implement a combination of co-payments and 
deductibles for medical care demanded by non-active duty personnel.  We intended to 
demonstrate that by introducing higher costs for health care to consumers the amount of 
care they demanded should decrease.  The reduced demand for health care would allow 
DoD to control the rising costs of military health care.  However, the information 




On the other hand, data obtained while researching this project indicated that self-
selection may be occurring among Tricare Standard enrollees.  The new objective of this 
project is to demonstrate that self-selection is occurring and investigate its driving 
factors.    
To support our objective, we must review and analyze some important aspects of 
military health care.  These aspects are: 
• Provide the history of the military health care system and its attempts to 
control costs. 
• Analyze the cost drivers for the military health care system. 
• Define self-selection and provide examples of its occurrence. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary research question to support our objective: Is self-selection occurring 
among Tricare Standard enrollees?  Other important questions that we will attempt to 
answer include: 
1. What enrollee characteristics lead to self-selection? 
2. Is there evidence that self-selection is occurring in health care programs 
outside of DoD? 
By answering these questions, useful insight can be gained into the behavior of 
beneficiaries and why they consume medical care.  This information can then be used by 
DoD to create new policies that could help it to control health care costs in the future. 
 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 
This project is expected to result in a better understanding of factors that affect a 
beneficiary’s decision to select a health care plan.  Understanding these factors can 
influence policy decisions that may finally allow DoD to control health care costs.  This 
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is beneficial because resources previously dedicated to health care can be used for other 
vital areas, such as weapon system modernization and capital investment.  DoD should 
operate effectively and utilize its resources efficiently.  It is our belief this project will 
provide a demonstration of how the military can maintain the readiness of its forces, 
continue to offer access to quality health care for beneficiaries, and control costs. 
 
E. CONDUCT OF STUDY 
 
This project first analyzes the military health care system which consists of 
military treatment facilities and the Tricare system.  We attempt to calculate the 
deadweight loss of the military health care system by collecting data on price, quantity, 
elasticity of demand, and wait times in an effort to ascertain the affects on demand by 
imposing various levels of co-payments and deductibles on the non-active duty 
beneficiary population.  To achieve this, various data were collected from other studies 
and the Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2).  
Analysis of the data collected indicated a problem for calculating deadweight loss.  The 
M2 system does not collect and organize the necessary data required to calculate average 
cost per visit to the consumer for inpatient or outpatient care.  To complicate matters, our 
research could not yield any studies previously conducted on wait times for military 
health care facilities.  Although our quest to calculate deadweight loss was not 
achievable, the data did reveal a phenomenon called self-selection.  With our inability to 
calculate our initial goal, this project then attempted to confirm if self-selection was 
indeed what we were seeing. 
The following assumptions were considered during the conduct of this project.  
First, active duty personnel are required to maintain a high level of health as part of 
requirement for operational readiness.  To achieve this readiness, active duty personnel 
receive more medical care than the average person.  That care is currently free to active 
duty personnel and should remain so, and the costs associated with that care will not be 
considered in this project.  Another assumption is that the ability to access health care by 
Tricare enrollees, particularly dependents of active duty personnel and retirees, should 
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not be reduced.  The goal of implementing cost sharing initiatives is only to control the 
cost of health care for DoD by reducing the demand for that care.  This project is not 
attempting to lower the quality of health care for beneficiaries.  
Chapter II of this project provides background on the missions of the military 
health care system and the CHAMPUS program.  It discusses why CHAMPUS was 
started and the problems the program experienced.  Also discussed is the rationale behind 
eliminating the CHAMPUS program and introducing the current health care program of 
Tricare.   
Chapter III provides a detailed description of the Tricare program.  It examines 
the beneficiaries of the system, the cost drivers for the program, and how the Tricare 
program operates in comparison to civilian health care plans.  Also addressed are future 
cost projections for military health care under current assumptions and program structure.  
We also compare these projections to private sector health care cost projections. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of the data collected during this project.  It describes our 
attempts to achieve our initial goal of calculating the deadweight loss of the military 
health care system through introduction of the following variables: elasticity of demand, 
price, quantity of care consumed, and wait times for individuals who consumed health 
care in the military health care system.  This chapter also describes the problems 
encountered with the data and discusses why we could not achieve the original goal of 
this project.  The data did provide useful information, however, and provided value for 
this project.  The data revealed that self-selection was evident in the military health care 
system and as a result, this project reviews what self-selection is and attempts to validate 
that this phenomenon is occurring in the military health care system. 
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The Dependents’ Medical Care Program became effective on December 7, 1956.  
It was established by the Dependents’ Medical Care Act, which authorized dependents of 
active duty military members to receive medical care benefits from civilian physicians 
and hospitals.  These benefits were limited and applied only toward inpatient care.  The 
intention of this legislation was to foster improved morale throughout the armed forces 
by providing an improved and standardized medical care program for members and their 
dependents.1
The Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966 created the Civilian Health 
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), which expanded upon the 
Dependents’ Medical Care Program to provide additional medical care benefits.  These 
amendments extended coverage from civilian sources to retired members, their 
dependents, and the dependents of deceased members.  The additions included outpatient 
care and drugs for all beneficiaries.  For active duty personnel, a special care program 
was established for dependents suffering from mental retardation or who were seriously 
physically handicapped.  Not included in the amendments were certain routine 
examinations and dental care.2  
 
1 Comptroller General of the United States (1971), B-133142, Potential for Improvements in the 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. Summary Report to the Committee on 
Appropriations House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. p. 1. 
2 Ibid.  
 10
                                                
2. Missions 
The military health system has both a readiness and benefits mission.3  The 
readiness mission involves the ability to provide medical services for wounded and 
injured personnel during wartime, as well as maintaining the health of the military during 
peacetime.  The benefits mission also occurs during times of war as well as during times 
of peace by providing medical care to eligible beneficiaries of service members, such as 
dependents, retirees and their dependents, and survivors of retirees.4 DoD believes that 
offering peacetime care provides a valuable benefit to personnel, which aids recruiting 
and retention, but also allows medical personnel in military hospitals the opportunity to 
train in diagnosing and treating a broader range of patient conditions.5
Prior to 1990, the military treatments facilities (MTFs) could not meet the 
requirements for both missions.  The United States was in the middle of the Cold War, 
and with the numerous casualties that occurred during World War II still memorable, the 
wartime capacity requirement for MTFs was based on the casualties estimated from an 
all-out conventional war in Europe.  The combat casualties and non-battle disease from 
this scenario would have exceeded the military’s medical system’s ability to provide 
adequate care.  To compensate for the possible shortage of treatment facilities, DoD 
arranged to use civilian and veterans administration hospitals in the United States.6
 
3. Operations 
MTFs were the primary provider of medical service to military beneficiaries, and 
medical service at these facilities was free for all eligible personnel.  The MTF system 
could be broken down based on the size of the facilities.  The largest division of hospitals 
 
3 Jacob Klerman & M. Kilburn,  (1998), The Effects of Changing Staffing in Military Treatment 
Facilities, National Defense Research Institute, RAND publication MR-631, p. 3. 
4 Congressional Budget Office (1994, July), CBO Papers: Easing the Burden: Restructuring and 
Consolidating Defense Support Activities, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 14.  
5 Congressional Budget Office (1995, July), CBO Papers: Restructuring Military Medical Care, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 2. 
6 Neil M. Singer,  (1994, April 19), Reforming the Military Health Care System, Statement of Acting 
Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on 
Military Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C., p. 2.  
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was the medical centers.  These medical centers had hundreds of beds and offered a wide 
range of services to their patients.  These centers also offered graduate medical education 
to personnel who were training to be military medical staff.  The next lower division of 
military facilities was the medium sized hospital.  The medium sized hospitals usually 
had between 70 and 200 beds and offered many of the same services as the medical 
centers.  The lowest division of military facility was the small hospital which had less 
then 70 beds and offered only basic medical care.  In 1992, the military health system had 
18 medical centers, 30 medium hospitals, and 69 small hospitals throughout the world.7
All of these medical facilities had a defined service area, referred to as a 
catchments area.  These service areas included all the land located within 40 miles of the 
military hospital.  Since military hospitals were located in high concentration areas of 
military forces, their service was available to 87 percent of all active duty personnel, 80 
percent of their dependents, and 57 percent of retirees and other beneficiaries.8  Some 
areas also established off-base clinics that catered to non-active duty personnel and were 
staffed with civilian doctors.   
Since MTFs had limited resources, not all beneficiaries could receive medical 
care when they wanted it.  To solve this problem, the MTFs created a priority system to 
determine the order in which beneficiaries received medical care.  Since active duty 
personnel could receive medical care only at MTFs, they had first priority.  All other 
beneficiaries could seek medical care at an MTF on a space available basis.  Dependents 
of active duty members had the next highest priority, followed by retirees and their 
dependents.9
Since medical care was not always available at the MTFs for second and third 
priority beneficiaries, DoD established a FFS insurance program called CHAMPUS.  
 
7 Susan Hosek, Bruce Bennett, Joan Buchanan, M. Marquis, Kimberly McGuigan, Janet Hanley, 
Rodger Madison, Afshin Rastegar, Jennifer Hawes-Dawson. (1995), The Demand for Military Health 
Care: Supporting Research for a Comprehensive Study of the Military Health Care System, RAND 
Monograph Report, MR-407-1-OSD, p. 4.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Jacob Klerman, M. Kilburn. (1998), The Effects of Changing Staffing in Military Treatment 
Facilities, National Defense Research Institute, RAND publication MR-631, p. 4. 
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CHAMPUS was designed to cover most of the cost of care received from civilian health 
care providers when care in military facilities was not available.10   
Beneficiaries within military hospital service areas had to receive the local 
hospital commander’s authorization to use CHAMPUS, in the form of a statement of 
non-availability. This form acknowledged that the required care could not be provided in 
the regional military facility, either due to the facility being too busy to provide the 
service or due to the service not being available.11
Unlike MTFs that provided medical service for free, there were fees associated 
with using CHAMPUS, but they were not as high as in most civilian plans.  Typical 
civilian health plans at the time included an annual premium, a deductible of around $200 
per individual, and a 20 percent co-payment.12  CHAMPUS did not require the 
beneficiary to pay an enrollment free or premium.  However, beneficiaries were 
responsible for co-payments and deductibles for any service received outside an MTF, as 
summarized in Table 1.  CHAMPUS also acted as a second payer insurance program, 
meaning that if a beneficiary had employer-provided health insurance, that insurance 
would pay first and then CHAMPUS would cover any remaining portion.  Retirees were 
eligible to use CHAMPUS only until the age of 65, at which time their medical coverage 
automatically transferred to the Medicare program.  However, retirees were still allowed 




10 Neil M. Singer. (1994, April 19), Reforming the Military Health Care System, Statement of Acting 
Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on 
Military Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C., p. 2. 
11 Congressional Budget Office (1995, July), CBO Papers: Restructuring Military Medical Care, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 14.  
12  Susan Hosek,  Bruce Bennett, Joan Buchanan, M. Marquis, Kimberly McGuigan, Janet Hanley, 
Rodger Madison, Afshin Rastegar,  Jennifer Hawes-Dawson (1995), The Demand for Military Health 
Care: Supporting Research for a Comprehensive Study of the Military Health Care System, RAND 
Monograph Report, MR-407-1-OSD, p. 15. 
13 Jacob Klerman, M. Kilburn. (1998), The Effects of Changing Staffing in Military Treatment 
Facilities, National Defense Research Institute, RAND publication MR-631, p. 4.  
Table 1.   Summary of MTF & CHAMPUS Cost Sharing 
 
Active Duty Dependents Retirees & Their Family Members
MTF
Outpatient None None
Inpatient $9.30/day Retiree: $4.90/day  Spouse: $9.30/day
CHAMPUS
Outpatient Deductible Single: E-1 to E-4 $50, others $150     Family: E1 to E-4 $100,others $300 Single: $150    Family: $300
Co-payment 20% 25%
Inpatient Max ($25, $9.30/day) Min (25%, $271/day)
Out of pocket Max 
family $1,000 $7,500  
Source: From Handbook of Military Families, 1994 Edition 
 
B. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH CHAMPUS 
 
1. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard, in the context of medical care, is the tendency of people with 
medical insurance to alter their normal behaviors.  An example of this is people engaging 
in riskier behavior due to the fact their medical expenses are paid for by their insurance 
policy.  Another demonstration of moral hazard is when people do not pay the full cost of 
a service or product; they have a tendency to demand more of it.  The fact that medical 
care in the military health care system is virtually free causes an increase in demand for 
care.  
Military medical care beneficiaries can receive free treatment for outpatient care 
at any MTF.  For inpatient care at MTFs, the cost to the beneficiary in no way represents 
the true cost of the care he receives.  Similarly, military beneficiaries using the 
CHAMPUS system pay no premiums or enrollment fees for the health care insurance 
they receive and they are not restricted by CHAMPUS from returning to the MTFs for 
free medical care when it is desired.  Co-payments and deductibles for the care received 
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under the CHAMPUS umbrella are also low.  Both of these factors have created a high 
demand on the military medical system.14
Compounding the moral hazard problem faced by the military health care system 
is the perception (propensity to collect on benefits promised them) by active duty 
members and retirees that medical care is a benefit of their career’s compensation 
package, and therefore, should be fully utilized.  This adds to access problems, especially 
for retirees over the age of 65.  This group is not eligible for care under CHAMPUS and 
they rank last in priority at MTFs.15
 
2. Rational Ignorance 
Rational ignorance occurs when the cost of acquiring information is greater than 
the benefit derived from the information.  The cost of acquiring information could be the 
use of time or other resources which could be better used doing something else.  Since 
military medical care is essentially free, there is no incentive for the beneficiary to be 
informed about the cost of care he receives.  The costs associated with CHAMPUS make 
beneficiaries determine whether or not they want to wait for free care at a MTF or 
partially pay for care from a civilian doctor. 
Rational ignorance is not limited to just beneficiaries.  Military medical providers 
are offered few incentives to economize on care.  First, military hospital budgets are 
allotted annually and based on workload.  Therefore, hospitals have an incentive to 
ensure hospital beds are filled with patients throughout the year so that all the money 
granted by Congress in that fiscal year is spent.16  This allows military doctors to 
 
14 Neil M. Singer, (1994). Reforming the Military Health Care System. Statement of Acting Assistant 
Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on Military 
Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., p. 
5. 
15 Congressional Budget Office (1995, July). CBO Papers: Restructuring Military Medical Care. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 19.  
16 Neil M. Singer,  (1994). Reforming the Military Health Care System. Statement of Acting Assistant 
Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on Military 
Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., p. 
8. 
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recommend longer stays in military hospitals for patients than they would normally 
receive at civilian hospitals. 
Adding to the problem is that military doctors are not accountable for the amount 
of money spent under CHAMPUS or the amount of care military beneficiaries received 
from the CHAMPUS system.  As a result, there is no incentive for military doctors to 
coordinate care between the MTFs and facilities covered under the CHAMPUS system. 
This accounts for the great inefficiencies between the two systems.17
 
3. Tragedy of the Commons 
Government provision of military health care results in what economists call “a 
tragedy of the commons.”  The “commons” in this case is the military health care 
provided by MTFs.  The resources available at MTFs are limited and a large population 
of beneficiaries is entitled to their services.  Consumers of this common good are guided 
by self-interest.  Beneficiaries using the military health system are concerned about the 
personal gain they receive from utilizing the MTF system.  They do not take account of 
the fact that their use of the system makes less available for others, because they do not 
have an incentive to take account of that fact.  Thus, as beneficiaries seek more and more 
health care at the MTFs the capacity will be exceeded.  The loss of use that occurs from 
overloading the system is “commonized” among all beneficiaries in the form of long wait 
lines for care or care being unavailable (for sizing considerations of the system see the 
733 Study discussion in the next section).18  
If one individual’s use of the military health system did not affect the use of 
others, then there would be no tragedy.  Unfortunately, the free health care provided at 
MTFs creates a huge demand on the system, so that not all beneficiaries can receive the 
free health care to which they are entitled.  Access to the system is rationed by the 
priority system and the distance to the nearest military facility.  These beneficiaries are  
 
 
17 Congressional Budget Office (1995, July). CBO Papers: Restructuring Military Medical Care. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 17. 
18 Garrett Hardin,  (1993). The Tragedy of the Commons, The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics. In 
D.R. Henderson (Ed). Warner Books, Inc., pp. 88-89.  
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left with the decision to pay for health care through the CHAMPUS system, to pay 
through an employer-provided health plan, to pay for service out of their own pockets, or 
not to seek health care at all. 
 
C. MANDATE FOR REFORM 
 
1. Section 733 Study 
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 
Congress ordered DoD to analyze both the peacetime and wartime requirements for the 
military health care system.  The goal of the study was to determine how the military 
health care system could meet the new challenges of wartime in the post-Cold War 
world.  The study would also focus on how the military could provide cost-effective 
peacetime health care to its many beneficiaries.19
The wartime mission of the military health system had to be changed to reflect the 
new wartime planning policies.  During the Cold War, MTF capacity was based on an 
all-out conventional war in Europe; however, in the post-Cold War era, MTF capacity 
would be based on the ability of the military to fight two simultaneous major regional 
conflicts.  As a result of this change in policy, DoD estimated that casualties suffered on 
the battlefield would be substantially less than had been planned for during the Cold War.  
Based on this estimation, the study concluded that the capacity of the MTF system was 
above the new wartime requirements.  If the capacity of the veteran and civilian hospitals 
DoD intended to use to backup the MTFs was considered, the gap between supply and 
demand would be even greater.  Of course, this is a sharp contrast from the situation 
faced by DoD during the Cold War.20
 
19 Neil M. Singer,  (1994). Reforming the Military Health Care System. Statement of Acting Assistant 
Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on Military 
Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., p. 
8. 
20 Neil M. Singer,  (1994). Reforming the Military Health Care System. Statement of Acting Assistant 
Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on Military 
Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., p. 
9. 
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The peacetime mission of the study focused on the economics of sizing the 
military medical system.  DoD wanted to determine if providing care at MTFs was more 
cost-effective than providing that care through the CHAMPUS system.  DoD analyzed 
what would happen to military medical costs if the capacity of the MTFs was slightly 
increased.  This scenario was analyzed because DoD believed that increasing the capacity 
in the military medical system would be more appealing to people using CHAMPUS and, 
therefore, cause them to return to the MTF system. 
The analysis concluded that on an individual basis, it costs less to provide care to 
beneficiaries at MTFs than through CHAMPUS.  However, the analysis also concluded 
that increasing access to MTFs would increase overall medical costs for the military.21  
The military would experience savings on an individual basis, but the increase in volume 
of “ghost beneficiaries” at MTFs would drive up overall costs.  “Ghost beneficiaries” are 
people who are eligible to use the military health care system but do not do so.22 They 
may have employer-provided health insurance through a spouse, may pay for medical 
service out of pocket, or may not seek medical care at all.       
As part of the 733 Study, the RAND Corporation conducted a national survey to 
compare utilization rates of military and civilian health care.  To measure annual health 
care usage, RAND calculated the average number of outpatient visits per person and the 
percentage of recipients who received any hospital care.  The data were adjusted for the 
differences in age, sex, and other characteristics between the military and civilian 
populations. 
For outpatient care, active duty personnel make 36 percent more visits per year 
than civilian HMO enrollees.  This number seems reasonable since the military mandates 
a certain number of visits per year for active duty personnel to maintain a high level of 
readiness required for their jobs.  Interestingly, active duty dependents made 32 percent 
 
21 Neil M. Singer,  (1994). Reforming the Military Health Care System. Statement of Acting Assistant 
Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommittee on Military 
Forces and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C., p. 
9-10. 
22 Congressional Budget Office (1994, July), CBO Papers: Easing the Burden: Restructuring and 
Consolidating Defense Support Activities, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, p. 15. 
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more visits, and retirees, both under and over the age of 65, made 26 percent more visits, 
than civilian HMO enrollees.  With regard to inpatient care, all military beneficiary 
groups have higher rates than their civilian counterparts.23
This higher utilization of the military medical system is most likely caused by the 
fact that care at MTFs is free and MTFs provide two-thirds of the care to active duty 
dependents and one-third of the care to retirees and their dependents.24  Since care is free 
for beneficiaries, they will seek more of it.25  If a higher percentage of the beneficiaries 
received care at MTFs, there would most likely be a larger gap in the difference between 
military and civilian health care utilization.   
The high utilization of the MTF system bolsters the results of the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment which studied the effects of cost sharing on medical use and 
health.  The five-year study tracked the medical usage of people with health insurance 
plans of various co-payments and deductibles.  Some people in the study had plans that 
involved zero cost sharing while others faced much higher out of pocket expenses for all 
medical care received.  The objective of the experiment was to determine if the cost of 
health care influenced the amount of medical care people would seek and if their overall 
health would be affected.  The study concluded that people who do not have to pay for 
medical care will seek more of it and their overall health will be no different than people 
who do not seek as much medical care due to having a higher cost sharing health plan.  
The people with the cost sharing plans did not visit the doctor as often for minor health 
issues such as colds, but would seek medical care if they felt they had a more serious 
ailment.26
 
23 Susan Hosek, Bruce Bennett, Joan Buchanan, M. Marquis, Kimberly McGuigan, Janet Hanley, 
Rodger Madison, Afshin Rastegar, Jennifer Hawes-Dawson,  (1995). The Demand for Military Health 
Care: Supporting Research for a Comprehensive Study of the Military Health Care System. RAND 
Monograph Report, MR-407-1-OSD. p. 12. 
24 Ibid, p. 13. 
25 The requirement for certain visits while on active duty due to medical readiness standards sets the 
threshold of free care expectations through learned behavior.  This behavior may carry over to retirement.   
This behavior may also be explained because beneficiaries have been “educated” to use it; regardless of 
free or learned, they use more of it,   
26 Emmett Keeler,  (2004). Effects of Cost Sharing on Use of Medical Services and Health. RAND 




This section provided a history of the military health system prior to the 
implementation of the Tricare program.  Congress authorized the development of 
CHAMPUS to allow greater access for military beneficiaries to health care.  Health care 
was still provided to beneficiaries at MTFs, but due to over-utilization of the system by 
beneficiaries, not all could receive the care they desired.  This over-utilization was 
created by the lack of economic incentives in the military health system, described by 
moral hazard, rational ignorance, and tragedy of the commons. 
After 30 years of CHAMPUS, Congress realized that a new system was needed to 
meet the burdens caused by a growing population of beneficiaries within the military 
health care system.  The 733 Study recognized many of the faults of the military health 
care system, and one of the outcomes was a new plan to lower the cost of health care for 
the military.  The outcome was a new program called Tricare.  Tricare would be a 
managed care plan that would ensure access to high quality health care and improve the 
efficiency of the military health care system.  To accomplish this, Tricare would be 
regionally managed, offer a three-option benefit package, and use capitated budgeting.  In 
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III. TRICARE PROGRAM 
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
 
1. Entitlement or Health Insurance Plan 
The Tricare military health care program was created as a result of the 733 Study 
that identified numerous flaws of the previous CHAMPUS program.  These flaws were 
created by moral hazard, rational ignorance, and tragedy of the commons issues that often 
plague programs that lack the correct incentives.  To correct these problems, DoD created 
a military health care system that would operate as a managed care plan to improve 
efficiency and ensure access to quality health care for active duty personnel, their 
dependents, and retirees. 
The military health care system provides medical care to members of the armed 
services, including active duty and reserve components, their dependents and retirees.  
Organizations other than DoD are authorized access to the Tricare program.  These 
include: active members of the Coast Guard in the Department of Transportation, the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and members of the 
Public Health Service.  This program is budgeted for by the President and provided 
through appropriation law by the Congress of the United States.  It should be understood 
that Tricare is the name of a health benefit program and is not health insurance.  The 
insurance portion of the benefit program is provided by private health insurance 
companies under the health benefit program called Tricare. 
 
2. Structure 
The Tricare program is broken into three regions in the Continental United States 
(CONUS).27  Members living overseas fall into the Tricare overseas program.  In 
CONUS, the Tricare program is segregated into three regions: North, South and West.  
The North region is managed by the private firm, Health Net, Inc., one of the largest 
 
27 A complete list of states covered by region within CONUS can be found in Appendix A through C. 
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publicly traded health care companies.28 Health Net is an HMO that provides a full range 
of health care services to its members from health care providers within the HMO 
network. 
The South region29 is managed by Humana Military which is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Humana, Inc.30 Humana is also a HMO that provides health care services to 
its members. 
The West region31 is not managed by an HMO.  It is managed by TriWest Health 
Care Alliance which is a company contracted by DoD that administers the Tricare 
program in the West region.32  TriWest Health Care Alliance is owned by many of the 
major health insurance companies that also act as subcontractors for TriWest Health Care 
Alliance.  The major shareholder in the company is Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Association.33 Blue Cross and Blue Shield is a trade association for independent Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield companies that sell local plans.  This arrangement allows it to 
function as an HMO. 
Tricare overseas is subdivided into five different regions: Canada, Puerto Rico 
and Central America, Latin America, Europe and Pacific.34  The overseas regions are not 
managed by large HMO companies but rather by a complex network of CHAMPUS 
 
28 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Tricare Management Activity 
(2006). Tricare Region North Handbook. Retrieved January 27, 2006, from U.S. Department of Defense 
Military Health System. Website: 
https://www.hnfs.net/common/companyInfo/Health+Net+Federal+Services.htm 
29 A complete list of areas covered by the South region can be located in Appendix B. 
30 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Tricare Management Activity 
(2006). Tricare Region South Handbook. Retrieved January 27, 2006, from U.S. Department of Defense 
Military Health System. Website: 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/tricaresmart/product.aspx?id=146&CID=59&RID=2 
31 A complete list of areas covered by the West region can be located in Appendix C. 
32 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Tricare Management Activity 
(2006). Tricare Region West Handbook. Retrieved January 27, 2006, from U.S. Department of Defense 
Military Health System. Website: 
http://www.tricare.osd.mil/tricaresmart/product.aspx?id=125&CID=46&RID=1 
33 TriWest Health care Alliance (2005). TriWest Ownership. Retrieved January 27, 2006. Website: 
https://www.triwest.com/triwest/default.html 
34 A complete list of areas covered by overseas region is located in Appendix D. 
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claims processors.35 Although overseas regions are managed differently than CONUS 
regions, the product offerings to the beneficiaries of the Tricare program and eligibility 
requirements remain the same. 
A detailed analysis of the complexity of operations of overseas regions is not 
presented in this work.  The focus of the analysis is on the health care option plans 
available to eligible members of the Tricare program in the United States, since these 
option plans are the same regardless of region and eligibility requirements.  It is the 
option plans that are pertinent to the thesis of this work. 
 
3. Health Care Plan Options 
Despite being managed by three different private companies in three different 
regions in CONUS and a network of complex claims processors overseas, the Tricare 
program offers its beneficiaries only three different program options from which to 
choose.  Eligibility requirements are set by the individual services.  To be eligible for 
Tricare benefits, members must enroll in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting 
System (DEERS).  This system is an extensive database that keeps track of all active duty 
members, their dependents, retirees and their dependents, and survivors.  To maintain 
eligibility for Tricare benefits, a member must be enrolled in DEERS at all times and his 
information must remain accurate and current.  Members in uniform on an active status 
and retired military are automatically enrolled in the DEERS system.  These individuals 
however, must enroll their family members in order for them to be eligible for the 
benefit.  Below is a description of each of the option plans.36
a. Tricare Prime 
This option is Tricare’s managed care option, which is similar to a private 
sector HMO where all MTFs are considered part of the network of care givers available 
to members.  The Prime option is tailored for active duty service members in CONUS 
and Prime Remote covers members in remote areas, usually greater than 50 miles from 
 
35 Edward D. Martin, (1999, July 16), Letter.  Policy for Active Duty Claims Processing Overseas. 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). Washington D.C. 
36 A complete description of all plans is available at the Tricare Website: http://www.tricare.org 
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an MTF.  Overseas Prime is available for active duty service members and their families 
in three overseas regions: Europe, Pacific and Latin America/Canada.  Tricare Global 
Remote provides service members and their families with the Prime benefit when 
stationed in designated remote overseas locations. 
Members who are enrolled in this option get their medical care at the MTF 
with a primary care manager (PCM) coordinating the care.  These PCMs are usually 
general practitioners and not specialists in a particular field of medical science.  Rules 
governing this option are strict and must be followed.  According to the rules, an enrollee 
must seek care at an MTF first.  If a specialist must be seen for any reason, then the PCM 
must submit a referral to the regional contractor for approval and authorization.  If a 
member does not receive this approved referral from the regional contractor, the member 
can be liable for costly Point of Service (POS) charges which will be discussed later. 
The major advantage of Tricare Prime is that it offers the lowest cost to 
the member.  Since primary care is provided by the MTF and the PCM submits referrals 
to see a specialist, this option typically yields no out of pocket expenses for the member.  
The only charges that may result are POS charges caused by a member’s failure to obtain 
a referral authorization.  The disadvantage of this option is the lack of flexibility in 
selecting his care provider.  Once the Prime option has been selected by the service 
member, the physician that provides the service is usually the physician that is on duty 
during the member’s visit. 
b. Tricare Standard 
This option is for members who are not enrolled in the Prime option.  This 
option provides greater flexibility than Prime by allowing members to choose either an 
MTF or a participating certified private sector provider.  This option was CHAMPUS 
prior to the Tricare program coming into existence, and requires no enrollment.  
However, this option requires an annual deductible to be met before Tricare will begin to 
pay on a beneficiary’s claim.  Standard is a typical FFS medical insurance program. 
The advantage of this option is flexibility.  Beneficiaries can choose the 
physician they desire as long as they are authorized by the regional contractor and the 
physician is a participating provider in the Tricare network.  The disadvantage of this 
 25
                                                
option is that the member is required to file claims forms and will share part of the costs 
of this service through deductibles and co-payments.37  Also, Tricare Standard does not 
cover all health care.  Procedures not covered are listed in Appendix E.  Another 
disadvantage to Standard is the eligibility restrictions.  Active duty members are not 
eligible for Tricare Standard; they must use Prime. 
c. Tricare Extra 
The third and final option is Tricare Extra.  It seems similar to Tricare 
Standard, but there are differences.  Similar to Standard, there are no enrollment 
requirements or annual fees.  However, there are annual deductibles that must be met and 
there are differences in cost shares as outlined in Table 2.  Under Extra, members receive 
discounts from cost shares for using in-network providers and there are no claims to file 
under this option as there are under the Standard option.  Essentially, Extra is an option 
for Standard beneficiaries who want to save costs by using Prime facilities over Tricare 
Standard-authorized in-network providers. 
Like the Standard option, active duty members are not eligible for Extra.  
The major difference between Standard and Extra is the out of pocket expense for the 
beneficiary.  Cost share is a major difference between all options and these differences 
are provided below in Tables 2 and 3 for each type of beneficiary of each option. 
 
37 A complete comparison of deductibles and cost shares between options are provided in Tables 2 & 
3. 
Table 2.   Cost Shares and Deductibles for Active Duty Family Members 
 
TRICARE Prime TRICARE Standard TRICARE Extra
Annual Deductible None
$150/individual or 
$300/family for E-5 & 
above; $50/$100 for E-4 & 
below
$150/individual or 
$300/family for E-5 & 
above; $50/$100 for E-4 & 
below
Annual Enrollement Fee None None None
Civilian Outpatient Visit No Cost 20% of allowed charges for covered service 15% of negotiated fee
Civilian Inpatient 
Admission No Cost
Greater of $25 or 
$13.90/day
Greater of $25 or 
$13.90/day
Civilian Inpatient Mental 
Health No Cost $20/day $20/day
Civilian Inpatient Skilled 
Nursing Facility Care
$0 per diem charge 
per admission
$11/day ($25 minimum) 
Charge per admission
$11/day ($25 minimum) 
Charge per admission
No separate cost 
share for separately 
billed professional 
charges  
Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
 
Table 3.   Cost Shares and Deductibles for Retirees, their family members and 
others 
TRICARE Prime TRICARE Standard TRICARE Extra
Annual Deductible None $150/individual or $300/family
$150/individual or 
$300/family
Annual Enrollement Fee $230/individual $460/family None None
Civilain Cost Shares 25% of allowed charges for covered services 20% of negotiated fee
Outpatient $12 
Emergency Care $30 
Mental Health Visit $25 
$17(group visit)
Civilian Inpatient Cost 
Share
$11/day           ($25 
minimum) Charge 
per admission
Lesser of $512/day or 25% 
of billed charges plus 25% 
of allowed professional 
fees
Lesser of $250/day or 
25% of negotiated 
charges plus 20% of 
negotiated professional 
fees
Civilian Inpatient Skilled 
Nursing Facility Care
$11/day           ($25 
minimum) Charge 
per admission
25% cost share of allowed 
charges for institutional 
services, plus 25% cost 
share of allowable for 
separately billed 
professional charges
$250 per diem cost share 
or 20% cost share of total 
charges, whichever is 
less, institutional services, 
plus 20% cost share of 
separately billed 
professional charges
Civilain Inpatient Mental 
Health $40 per day
Lesser of $169/day or 25% 
of allowable charges
20% of institutional & 
negotiated professional 
fees  
Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
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4. Other Program Aspects 
The Tricare program has some other details that must be explained.  These are 
sometimes thought to be option plans under the Tricare program, but are not plans of any 
kind.  Currently, the Tricare program offers only three plans: Prime, Standard and Extra.  
The other aspects of the Tricare program are discussed below. 
a. Tricare for Life  
Tricare for Life (TFL) applies only to retirees, their family members and 
survivors who are eligible for Medicare.  Under Congressional law, TFL is a permanent 
benefit for eligible members but on a conditional basis.  Eligibility requires the member 
to be eligible for Medicare Part A and to purchase Medicare Part B.  Medicare Part A is 
hospital insurance that eligible members typically do not pay for and is usually for 
inpatient services associated with hospital visits.  Medicare Part B is for outpatient 
services and generally requires the member to pay a premium for the plan.  The current 
premium for Part B is $88.50 per month in 2006.38  To be eligible for Medicare Part A or 
B, the member must be at least 65 years old or if under the age of 65, must possess 
certain approved disabilities to be eligible for coverage.  Members are usually 
automatically enrolled in Medicare within three months of turning 65.  This automatically 
makes the member eligible for TFL if the member’s information in DEERS is up to date. 
Having both Medicare and TFL coverage often makes it difficult to 
answer the question: “who pays for what?”  Four scenarios can occur with this dual 
coverage: 
1. Medicare and TFL covered services.  Under this scenario, Medicare will pay 
for its share and TFL will pay the remainder of the balance. 
2. Services covered by TFL but not Medicare.  Under this scenario, Medicare 
will process the claim; however, TFL will make the payment.  Also, the 
member is responsible for any required annual deductible and cost share. 
 
38 Source: Official Medicare Website: 
http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest=NAV|Home|GeneralEnrollment#TabTop 
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3. Services covered by Medicare and not TFL.  Under this scenario, Medicare 
pays its portion and TFL processes the claim but does not make any payment.  
The member is responsible for any annual deductible under Medicare as well 
as the associated cost share. 
4. Medicare and TFL do not cover any of the service.  This scenario is simple; 
Medicare and TFL will not pay for any service.  The member is responsible 
for the entire bill. 
Despite the complexity of TFL and Medicare as described above, TFL is 
basically a supplemental insurance program to Medicare Part B.  As long as the member 
remains eligible for Medicare Part B and his DEERS information is accurate, he will 
truly have Tricare for Life.  If the member also has any other supplemental medical 
insurance policy, such as one provided by the Military Officers Association of America 
(MOAA)39, this supplemental insurance will pay for any care before TFL makes any 
payment on services provided.   
b. Point of Service  
This is an option for members enrolled in Tricare Prime.  This option 
allows Prime participants to go outside the Prime care network, without an authorized 
referral, to seek care from any health care provider the member chooses for non-
emergency services.  However, this option can be costly.  If a Prime participant chooses 
this option, then annual deductibles and cost shares are assessed.  The annual deductible 
is $300 for an individual and $600 for a family.40 After the deductible is met, the 
additional cost share is 50 percent of the allowed Tricare charge.  For example, if a single 
active duty service member was having difficulty sleeping and wanted to have a sleep 
study conducted to determine what was causing the problem, assuming the local MTF 
will not provide a referral for this care, the member could obtain these services at his own 
expense through the POS option.  The service member would have to pay $300 to meet 
 
39 MOAA is the largest and most influential association in the United States for retired military 
officers.  There are several of these types of organizations that provide similar services as MOAA by 
service, organization or officer or NCO. Website:  http://www.moaa.org. 
40 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and the Tricare Management Activity 
(2005). The Tricare Handbook, Retrieved February 7. 2006, from U.S. Department of Defense Military 
Health System. Website: http://tricare.osd.mil/tricarehandbook/results.cfm?tn=1&cn=3 
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the annual deductible, and then pay 50 percent of the allowable charge for the sleep 
study.  The current allowable charge for a sleep study is $720 and the member would 
have to pay half of this, which is $360.  The member’s total cost for this service, 
assuming none of the annual deductible had been met, would be $660, the sum of the 
annual deductible and half of the allowable charge. 
A point of service option can take effect even if the Prime participant did 
not voluntarily elect to go out of the network for care.  If the member fails to obtain an 
approved referral or has the provider render services above and beyond the scope of the 
referral, the POS will automatically take effect.  The member will then be responsible for 
the annual deductible and cost share. 
 
B. THE PROBLEM WITH TRICARE 
 
1. Impending Crisis 
DoD has a great responsibility for providing health care coverage for over nine 
million beneficiaries and provides it through the Tricare program.41 This program faces 
the same challenges as the private sector in controlling costs to its beneficiaries.  The 
rising cost of health care threatens this nation’s best health care benefit program and also 
hampers DoD efforts to recapitalize its weapons systems and modernize its arsenals.  The 
Defense budget is the largest source of discretionary funding in the Federal Government 
and is viewed as a cash cow for Congressman looking to fund other projects through 
earmarks. This places additional pressure on discretionary funds.  Rising health care costs 
are also putting pressure on these discretionary funds. If not put in check, these pressures 
could cripple the United States Government’s ability to fund any program, defense or 
otherwise.  The worst case scenario is that DoD would not have the necessary funds to 
adequately defend the country against aggressors. 
Between 1988 and 2003, DoD’s spending on medical care nearly doubled, rising 
from $14.6 billion to $27.2 billion (in 2002 dollars), after adjusting for the overall rate of 
 
41 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C., p. 1 
inflation in the U.S. economy.42 DoD was also reducing the total active duty force during 
this 15-year period, which caused the spending per service member to increase from 
$6,600 to $19,600 (in 2002 dollars).43  Figure 1 graphically shows this trend of increasing 
cost versus declining total active duty service members. 
 
Figure 1 DoD Historical Medical Spending and Active Duty Force Size 
 
 
Source: From Congressional Budget Office based on information the Department of Defense’s 2003 Future 
Year’s Defense Program (for Medical Spending); Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 
2004/2005: Military Personnel Programs (for the 2003 accrual payment included in medical spending); 
and the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and Managed Care Forecasting and Analysis 
System (for the size of the active duty force). 
 
a. Excluding mobilized and full- time members the Reserves and National Guard. 
                                                 
42 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C., p. 1. 
43 These figures are calculated as medical spending on all beneficiaries divided by the number of 
active-duty service members.  
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In terms of wages earned, DoD’s medical spending rose from 26 cents for every dollar of 
wages for military personnel in 1988 to 55 cents for every dollar earned in 2003.44  
Figure 2 shows this graphically. 
 
Figure 2 Historical Medical Spending per Service Member and Relative to 
Cash Compensation, 1988 to 2003 
 
 
Source: From Congressional Budget Office based on information the Department of Defense’s 2003 Future 
Year’s Defense Program (for Medical Spending); Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 
2004/2005: Military Personnel Programs (for the 2003 accrual payment included in medical spending); 
and the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and Managed Care Forecasting and Analysis 
System (for the size of the active duty force); and DoD’s 1996 Military Background Compensation Papers 
and recent budget documents (for cash compensation). 
 
a. For purposes of this figure, mobilized and full-time reservists have not been counted as part of the active 
duty force. 
 
b. Cash compensation includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing and the basic allowance for 
subsistence. 
 
The Global War on Terrorism began in the first part of the 21st century.  Naturally 
this event will be a significant driver of health care costs for DoD due to a surge in 
                                                 
44 This analysis focused on wages earned rather than total compensation.  Total compensation varies 
greatly by service member and includes a wide variety of in-kind benefits whose value depends on the 
member’s marginal tax rate.  Another common metric for military pay is “regular military compensation,” 
or RMC, which includes cash compensation and the value of housing and subsistence allowance plus the 
tax advantage arising from the fact allowances are not taxed.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that medical benefits grew from 20 cents per dollar of RMC to 43 cents per dollar of RMC between 1988 
and 2003. Regardless of measure, the growth factor ratio is roughly the same 26:55 or 20:43. Thus it has 
doubled during the period. 
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combat wounds.  Peacetime care accounted for the overwhelming majority of health care 
costs in 2003.  Spending on military-specific programs, which have no counterparts in 
private-sector civilian health plans, made up only three percent ($900 million) of the 
department’s total medical spending in 2003.45 Military specific programs include exams 
for recruits, military public/occupational health and veterinary services.  This raises the 
possibility that the enormous health care burden experienced by DoD is not a result of the 
cost for military readiness. 
Health care costs have risen dramatically since 2000 (see Figure 3 for breakout of 
change in costs).  To determine what is specifically causing this dramatic rise in costs, a 
closer scrutiny of the specific drivers of these costs is in order.  The next section 
examines these drivers. 
 
2. Cost Drivers 
Cost drivers examined are in four specific areas: 1) changes in beneficiary 
population, 2) introduction of accrual budgeting, 3) net effects of changes in benefits and 
improved efficiency and 4) national increases in health care costs.  These four drivers 
together explain 100 percent of the growth in medical spending from 1988 to 2003 and 
explain why there has been a dramatic increase in growth from 2000 to 2003. 
a. Changes in Beneficiary Population 
Figure 1 shows that DoD purposely decided to reduce the size of the 
defense force, mostly as a result of the end of the Cold War.  The reduction was steep in 
the early part of the 1990s, with the rate of decrease leveling off during the middle part of 
the 1990s.  This reduction in force end strength caused a shift in the beneficiary 
population. 
During this drawdown, the number of active duty service members 
decreased from 2.2 million to 1.4 million while the number of retirees increased from 1.6 
million to 2.0 million.  The change is not a one-to-one ratio because not all members 
become eligible for retirement.  Roughly 30 to 40 percent of officers and 10 to 20 percent 
 
45 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C., p. 2. 
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of enlisted members become eligible for retirement.46 Once members become retirement 
eligible, this entitles them to a pension and medical benefits for themselves and their 
dependents for the remainder of their lives or until they reach age 65.  At age 65, 
Medicare insurance becomes the primary insurance and Tricare for Life becomes the 
supplemental insurance. 
According to a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study on medical care 
cost growth, changes in the number and mix of beneficiaries accounted for $3,000 of the 
$13,000 cost increase of health care per member between 1988 and 2003, nearly one 
quarter (23 percent) of the increase.47  This study took into account the factors of age, sex 
and military status, recognizing that older individuals on average consume more health 
care than younger individuals. 
b. Introduction of Accrual Budgeting 
In an effort to better identify the true cost of labor, law makers decided 
that at the start of 2003, DoD must budget for the cost of medical benefits for retirees.  
This includes retirees eligible for Tricare for Life, which is the benefit that covers any 
cost not covered by Medicare.48 Accrual budgeting involves recognizing the cost of 
future benefits (pensions and medical) to be received by employees who are working 
today.  In other words, to pay for the future benefits of current service members, DoD 
must recognize and pay a pre-set amount into the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care 





46 Beth J. Asch,  Richard Johnson,  and  John T. Warner,  (1998). Reforming the Military Retirements 
System. Monograph Report MR-748-OSD. Santa Monica: RAND distribution services. p. 2. 
47 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 5. 
48  Established by the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. 
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fund will have the money accrued to pay for their medical benefits.  Benefits for current 
retirees and service members in uniform prior to 2003 are considered an unfunded 
liability.49
  The Treasury is responsible for the management of this fund and invests 
the contributions in Treasury Bills.  The Treasury also is responsible for the unfunded 
liability and makes payments for the benefits being consumed by current retirees.  The 
unfunded liability is $400 billion and the amortized payment in 2003 was $14 billion.50 
The payment DoD must accrue in its budgets is not established within the department, 
but rather from an independent board of actuaries which calculates the payment on the 
basis of annual force end strength of personnel for both active duty and reservists.51
The shift to accrual budgeting had a dramatic effect on DoD spending; the 
effects of this shift can be seen in Figure 3.  This change has dramatically increased the 
slope of the projected growth curve and the result was an increase of $2,300 per active 
duty service member in 2003.  This explains 18 percent of the cost growth in the 15-year 
period between 1988 and 2003.52
c. Effects of Changes in Benefits and Improved Efficiency 
Improvement in medical care efficiencies and DoD policies contributed to 
a minor growth factor in health care costs between 1988 and 2003.  There are numerous 
factors attributed to this cost driver: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions 
after the Cold War ended the delay of payment of some contracts that were incurred in 
the 1990s but not settled until the 2000s, and changes in policies in the form of better 
managed care through the Tricare Prime option (HMO).  BRAC saw the consolidation 
and closure of many MTFs and pushed many beneficiaries out into the private sector 
system.  Another reason health care costs have grown is a result of temporary payment 
 
49 Congressional Budget Office (2002). Accrual Budgeting for Military Retirees’ Health Care. A CBO 
paper. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p 3. 
50 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Accrual Budgeting for Military Retirees’ Health Care. A CBO 
Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 6. 
51 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Accrual Budgeting for Military Retirees’ Health Care. A CBO 
Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 6. 
52 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 5. 
delays of contractor disputes over contracts enacted in 1995 but not settled until 2001.  
This delay pushed those costs into the future and in effect, understated DoD’s actual costs 
between 1995 and 2000.  Lawmakers also changed DoD policy in the 2001 National  
 
Figure 3 Actual and Projected growth in Medical Spending per Active Duty 
Service Member, 1988 to 2003 
 
Source: From Congressional Budget Office 
 
Note: Calculations in this figure include medical spending on all types of beneficiaries divided by the 
number of active duty members.  For purposes of this figure, mobilized and full-time reservists have not 
been counted as part of the active duty force. 
 
Defense Authorization Act which created the Tricare for Life program for Medicare 
eligible retirees.  This supplemental insurance benefit increased the cost to DoD and 
represents a significant portion of the increase in this cost driver.  These major factors 
contributed to a small increase of only 3 percent, or $400 per service member.53
d. National Increases in Health Care Costs 
Rising health care costs are not just a DoD phenomenon.  A CBO study by 
the National Security Division states: 
                                                 
53 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 7. 
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In the United States as a whole, per capita health care expenditures 
(adjusted for changes in the population in terms of age and sex) increased 
by 76 percent in real terms from 1988 to 2003.54
This is the most significant factor for the increase in costs for DoD health 
care in the past 15 years, and it accounts for over 50 percent in the rise of health care 
costs to DoD.  The factors causing this increase are similar to those faced in the private 
sector. These factors include advances in technology, changes in medical efficiencies and 
most important, the rising expenditures on medical equipment and drugs. 
Of the $36 billion in military health care spending in budget year 2005, 
approximately $11 billion is for private insurers that make up the Tricare system.55 The 
remaining amount is used for supplies and pharmaceuticals purchased from the same 
manufacturers civilian medical facilities purchase their equipment from.  What is not 
accounted for in this medical spending is the price of highly qualified physicians and 
nurses required to provide the excellent medical care received by the military 
personnel.56  
 
3. Private Sector Perspective 
The private sector is also fighting growth in health care costs but in a different 
manner than DoD.  The cost driver focused on here is national increases in health care 
costs since the underlying factor of this driver is the same for both DoD and the private 
sector.  Since policy changes within DoD (accrual budgeting and reduction in forces after 
the Cold War) account for nearly one half of its growth in health care costs, and can be 
considered one-time factors, they are ignored in the comparison. 
The amount spent on health care in the United States in 2004 was $1.9 trillion 
dollars, up 7.9 percent from 2003, and is 16 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
 
54 United States National Security Division (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of 
Defense. Study for the Congressional Budget Office. Washington, D.C. p. 3. 
55 Ceci Connolly,  (2005, April 22), Rising Medical Costs Worry Pentagon, Hill; Military Expenditure 
Has Doubled in 4 Years. The Washington Post, p. A15. 
56 Ibid. p. A13. 
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(GDP).57 The Center for Medicare and Medicaid services forecasts that actual spending 
in the United States for health care in 2015 will exceed $4.0 trillion dollars and will 
comprise 20 percent of GDP.58
The health care system in the United States is widely criticized for being 
inefficient as a result of being a huge bureaucracy that is poorly managed and riddled 
with fraud and waste.  These factors are believed to contribute to high prices, which in 
turn contribute to excessive costs.  Because of excessive costs in the U.S. health care 
system, firms are having a difficult time providing health benefits for their employees and 
as a result, firms have been reducing their health benefits or raising their cost shares, or 
both. 
In 2005, an annual survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research 
and Educational Trust, found that employer health insurance premiums rose by 9.2 
percent.  This was the first single digit rise in five years, but is still higher than overall 
inflation of 3.5 percent and employee wage growth of 2.7 percent.59 This same survey 
also showed the percentage of employers offering health benefits to their employees fell 
from 69 percent to 60 percent in one year. 
Employer insurance premiums continue to rise, employee wages continue to 
stagnate, and the number of employers offering health benefits is declining.  What does 
this mean to the employee?  It means the employee must share more of the burden of his 
health care costs into the future.  Employee spending for health insurance coverage has 
increased 126 percent between 2000 and 2004.60 One constant that will remain into the 
 
 
57 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005, March). National Health Expenditure 
Projections 2005-2015; Forecast Summary. Retrieved February 3, 2006, from Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services database. 
58 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005, March). National Health Expenditure 
Projections 2005-2015; Forecast Summary. Retrieved February 3, 2006, from Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services database. 
59 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2005, September). Employer Health Benefits Survey: 2005 
Summary Findings. .Health Research and Educational Trust. p. 1. 
60 Hewitt Associates LLC (2004, November). Health Care Expectations: Future Strategy and 
Direction 2005. Executive Summary of Hewitt Teleconference. p. 2. 
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foreseeable future is that employees in the private sector will continue to share a greater 
and greater portion of the health care burden.  This increase in burden will likely change 
behavior as prices and the true cost become less hidden in the eye of the consumer. 
In DoD, the costs to the government are increasing at the same rate as in the 
private sector, however, DoD is not shifting more of the burden to its beneficiaries, 
namely active duty member dependents and retirees.  Active duty personnel are ignored 
in this discussion since military readiness and the cost of this readiness goes beyond the 
scope of this paper.  As real health care costs rise for DoD, it continues to absorb them 
while making policy changes to increase access to health care.  This behavior continues 
to drive up overall costs to the department without shifting any cost burden to 
beneficiaries. 
 
4. Future Medical Spending Projections in DoD 
Predicting future spending on health care is a matter of assumptions.  It assumes 
DoD will not change any policies in effect currently and that costs per beneficiary grow 
at an annual rate projected for per capita health spending in the United States as a 
whole.61 These cost growth projections were computed by the CBO using a low, mid-
range and high estimate.  The high and low growth rate estimates used were 30 percent 
higher and lower than the mid-range estimate to account for any uncertainty in the mid-
range estimate. 
Choosing a growth factor rate is the most crucial step in accurately forecasting 
DoD health care spending.  The mid-range growth rate chosen by CBO for its projections 
was 6.25 percent in nominal terms and 4.1 percent in real terms for the growth in accrual 
payments to the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund.62  These rates were 
estimated by DoD actuaries and accepted by the CBO. 
 
61 The per capita growth projections in those expenditures is made by the Office of the Actuary, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
62 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 14. 
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The 30 percent number was not arbitrarily chosen by the CBO.  Analysts studied 
10-year projections by the Department of Health and Human Services over the last two 
decades.  Analysts found that the estimates varied by as much as 65 percent above, and 
45 percent below the actual growth during this period, and chose 30 percent based on 
these findings.63
DoD’s forecasted medical spending for the mid-range assumptions rises by 68 
percent, from $27 billion in 2003 to $46 billion in 2020.64  Using CBO’s estimate of the 
high range and cost growth rates that are 30 percent higher than in the mid-range 
estimate, the total spending could reach $52 billion by 2020, an increase of 93 percent.65 
Even the low range estimate has medial spending increasing by 46 percent.  These 
estimates are an important piece of information as it relates to the impact on the Federal 
Budget.  Incredibly, under the high range estimate, spending on medical care could reach 
the same level as that spent on cash compensation for service members in 2020.66
This illustrates one irrefutable fact.  As health care costs continue to dramatically 
rise, DoD is not addressing how these costs will be handled.  As the private sector is 
shifting the cost burden to employees to combat rising costs, DoD continues to keep the 
true cost of health care hidden from its employees.  Utilization of DoD medical care is 
high because beneficiaries have no mechanism to limit their usage.  As access to medical 
care continues to grow and DoD fails to shift cost sharing to its beneficiaries, the moral 
hazard dilemma will increase causing higher costs to insurance companies and thus 
greater costs to DoD. 
 
 
63 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 14, Box 2. 
64 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 13. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Congressional Budget Office (2003). Growth in Medical Spending by the Department of Defense. A 
CBO Study. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 13. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided an in depth discussion of the Tricare program in its entirety.  
Each program option, Tricare Prime, Tricare Standard and Tricare Extra, was examined 
to identify program eligibility requirements and what type of medical procedures are 
covered and not covered under these options.  Cost shares to beneficiaries and a 
comparison between options was reviewed.  Finally, other aspects of the Tricare program 
such as Point of Service and Tricare for Life programs were explained.  This in-depth 
discussion of the Tricare program was to inform the reader of the complexities of DoD’s 
health care program in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the mechanics of 
the program and to use it for comparisons to private sector health care plans. 
The middle part of this chapter examined the potential impending crisis in health 
care costs for DoD.  To explain what is causing this increase in cost to military health 
care, the major cost drivers were discussed.  These drivers were then compared to the 
private sector cost drivers in order to ascertain similarities or differences in cost growth.  
It is evident that rising costs for health care in DoD and the private sector are similar but 
each entity manages these costs differently. 
Finally, this chapter examined cost projections for both the private sector and 
DoD.  The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that health care costs are 
rising much faster than prices and wages.  The private sector is shifting part, or all, of this 
cost burden to employees to change behavior (consumption) through market forces 
(price) in order to save money.  However, DoD is not shifting costs to beneficiaries;67 the 
department is doing the opposite and is absorbing all the cost increases and, as a policy 
choice, expanding the benefits.  As costs continue to rise, it appears the private sector is 
confronting the issue appropriately while DoD continues to address the problem as it has 
for many decades, that is by keeping the cost of the benefit low to the service member 
 
67 Some argue DoD does this to hit retention and recruitment targets.  However, by not making 
significant differentiation between active and retired members, DoD ends up offering enhanced benefits to 
a full spectrum of the population including a segment of it destined to be a heavy user as it ages.  This is an 
impact of the all-volunteer force which needs thorough consideration.  
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while absorbing the cost.  DoD is shifting cost to the wrong cost center.  Since DoD will 
not shift the cost burden to the service member, it is making the conscious decision to 
trade off weapon system modernization by shifting the cost to the discretionary portion of 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. CALCULATING DEADWEIGHT LOSS 
 
1. Background 
The initial objective of this project was to determine the deadweight loss created 
by increased co-payments and deductibles to enrollees of Tricare Prime.  Deadweight 
loss is the cost to society created by inefficiency in the market.  As outlined in the 
previous two chapters, the lack of cost sharing by employees for medical expenses in the 
military health care system creates an enormous demand for health care.  Medical care at 
MTFs and care received through Tricare Prime are virtually free to beneficiaries. 
Based on the rules of supply and demand, inefficiency in the market is created 
when consumers receive a product or service at less than the equilibrium price.  When the 
price is at equilibrium, the cost of a service or product will determine how much of that 
service or product is demanded.  The amount demanded will equal the amount willingly 
supplied at that price.  Within the military health care system, the consumer of health care 
is not part of the financial decision that results for receiving care.  Therefore, he does not 
make the decision to consume based on cost.  This induces him to consume more health 
care, which creates inefficiencies in the market.  
In theory, the introduction of co-payments would raise the cost of health care for 
beneficiaries, which should induce less demand for health care.  The decrease in demand 
caused by beneficiaries choosing not to use the system, due to the increase in cost, can be 
used to determine the deadweight loss of the system.  Critical to calculating the full 
deadweight loss on the system would be the reduction in wait time created by fewer 
beneficiaries using the system. 
 
2. Review of Data Collected 
To calculate the deadweight loss on the system, information about the price, 
quantity, elasticity of demand, and wait time would have to be collected.  Price refers to 
the amount paid by the beneficiary.  The quantity used is calculated in visits per year for 
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outpatient care and admissions per year for inpatient care.  Elasticity of demand is a 
measure of the sensitivity of amount demanded to changes in quantity or price.  Price 
elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in quantity demanded resulting 
from a one-percent change in price.68
A study conducted for DoD by the RAND Corporation determined that there is a 
wide range in the estimates of elasticity of demand for health care. The study found that 
the elasticity of demand tended to center on -0.17.  This means that a one percent increase 
in the price of health care will lead to a 0.17 percent decrease in the quantity of health 
care purchased.  The study also found that lower levels of demand elasticity occur at 
lower levels of cost sharing.  Interestingly, demand was found to be income inelastic (0 to 
0.2).  The positive sign indicates that as income increases, the demand for health care 
services also increases.69
Knowing the elasticity of demand, our research focused on finding the quantity 
and price components needed for our analysis.  The data available were accessed from 
the Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2).70  This data 
base contains all available information associated with the military health system.  The 
information received from the database for 2005 can be found in Appendices F through 
K. 
Appendix F identifies the breakdown of the beneficiary population by Alternate 
Care Value (ACV) codes down the left column and beneficiary category (bencat) across 
the top.  ACV codes distinguish the beneficiary population by the different plan options 
utilized.  For instance, Prime enrollees are defined by ACV codes: A, B, E, F, H, J, and 
Q. Tricare Standard enrollees are defined by ACV code Z.  Bencats separate beneficiaries 
by the following values: bencat 1 is for dependents of active duty/National Guard, bencat 
 
68 Susan Hosek, Jeanne Ringel, Ben Vollaard, Sergej Mahnovski,  (2002). The Elasticity of Demand 
for Health Care: A Review of the Literature and Its Application to the Military Health System. National 
Defense Research Institute, RAND monograph report MR1355, p. 9.  
69 Ibid. p. 20.  
70 Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2). The data sets are:  
Purchased Care Institutional Summary (for the Admissions) and Purchased Care Non-Institutional 
Summary (for the Visits).  Retrieved April 4, 2006. 
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2 is for retired personnel, bencat 3 is for dependents of retired or survivor, other or 
unknown and bencat 4 is for active duty and National Guard.  
Appendix G is data selected for Purchased Care Inpatient Admissions.  Purchased 
care refers to when Tricare paid for civilian care.  The admissions count is the number of 
times individuals were admitted to civilian hospitals for inpatient care.  Cost data are also 
provided.  OHI refers to other health insurance, which is the cost that a supplemental 
insurance policy, owned by the beneficiary, paid for the care.  The amount paid by the 
patient overall refers to out of pocket expenses incurred by beneficiaries for care from co-
payments and deductibles.  Total expense incurred by Tricare is identified by the amount 
paid. 
Data regarding Direct Care Inpatient Dispositions, or inpatient care received at 
MTFs, is in Appendix H.  Dispositions refer to completed inpatient cases.  The data also 
came with variable and full cost data.  The variable cost is calculated by the military 
health system to relate the cost of procedures received at an MTF to that of a civilian 
hospital.  Full cost includes the variable cost but also the costs associated with the 
operation of military hospitals. 
Purchased Care Outpatient Visits data, or outpatient care received by beneficiaries 
at civilian doctors is found in Appendix I.  Unfortunately, outpatient visits cannot be 
separated by ACV code as with inpatient visits.  A discussion with operators of the 
Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) said Tricare 
Standard enrollees could be identified by the Enrollment Status of T, Y and FS. 
Appendix J provides data for Direct Care Encounters, or outpatient visits to 
MTFs.  As with purchased care, outpatient visits for direct care encounters could not be  
separated by ACV.  The problem of properly sorting this data was compounded by the 
fact that the data were not identified by Enrollment Status either.  The values of variable 
and full cost are also given. 
Appendix K provides a listing of the beneficiary category values and their 
meaning, ACV codes and their meaning, and the Enrollment Status Values and their 
meaning. 
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3. Problems with the Data 
On the surface it appeared that the Military Health System Management Analysis 
and Reporting Tool (M2) provided sufficient data to conduct our analysis.  Unfortunately, 
analysis revealed that the data did not provide the numbers that were required. 
For example, with purchased inpatient care, we could determine on average how 
many inpatient visits were made in 2005 by beneficiaries of Tricare Standard.  We could 
not, however, determine with any relevance the cost incurred by an individual for each 
visit.  Since Standard cost shares for inpatient care are based on the total number of days 
in the hospital per visit and annual deductibles based on rank and the size of the family, 
determining the average amount per visit per person would yield significant error into our 
calculations.  Complicating matters was that inpatient cost data at MTFs does not reflect 
cost to the consumer; it represents cost to the government.  The MTF inpatient data do 
not indicate the number of days spent in hospitals either.  If known, this data could be 
used to calculate an average cost to the consumer since patients are charged for meals per 
day while admitted to MTFs.  Similar issues occurred when analyzing outpatient care.  
Since cost shares to an individual for civilian outpatient care are based on a percentage of 
allowable charges, it could not be determined from the data, with any reasonable 
significance, the cost a consumer incurred per visit.  Although the cost for outpatient 
MTF visits (it is effectively zero) was known, how to determine which type of cost share 
to implement, flat-fee-per-visit or percent of allowable charge, and its usefulness to this 
analysis was indeterminable.  
Since we were unable to determine the cost to the consumer, data regarding wait 
time for care could be used to determine deadweight loss.  Unfortunately these data were 
also not available.  Several military facilities were contacted and all indicated that the 
average wait time for a beneficiary was not measured.  Research was conducted in an 
effort to find a study that had been conducted for average wait times at military facilities, 
but such studies could be found only for Veterans Administration hospitals.  These 




4. Indications of Self-Selection 
Although the original goal of this work could not be accomplished, further 
analysis of the data was done to determine if we could find anything useful in it.  Our 
original theory surmised that since Tricare Prime allows beneficiaries to consume health 
care virtually free of charge, users under Prime should consume significantly more health 
care than people who participate in Tricare Standard since they faced higher costs.  
Interestingly, further data analysis indicated that in fact the opposite was true.  Enrollees 
in Tricare Standard, individuals who had chosen to pay for care, had usage rates much 
higher than their Tricare Prime counterparts.  We then set out to determine if this was 
true for both inpatient and outpatient care, and what could be causing beneficiaries who 
pay for care to use more of it.  Our analysis leads us to believe what is occurring in the 
military health system is self-selection.  Tricare Standard enrollees are making an 
educated and conscious decision to enroll in a FFS health plan vice the virtually free 
Tricare Prime plan.  Our discussion on self-selection and the reasons for it will now be 
addressed. 
 
B. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Self-selection occurs when individuals voluntarily select themselves to become 
part of a particular group.  For this project, self-selection will refer to the voluntary 
selection of a health care plan.  Several articles and studies from around the world 
reinforce the hypothesis we are proposing: Tricare Standard enrollees select FFS 
coverage and use more health care per capita than enrollees in the military’s HMO, 
Tricare Prime, even though out of pocket expenses are higher.  This is the opposite of 
what was expected since increasing the cost of care to the consumer should reduce the 
amount of care demanded. 
HMOs were designed to promote competitive alternatives for individuals in FFS 
health care plans.  It was hoped HMOs would allow corporations to control increasing 
health care costs, but spiraling costs have proven that HMOs and corporations have failed 
to meet this goal.  It was assumed that individuals would select HMOs over FFS plans 
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due to the lower cost shares realized for being enrolled in the program.  However, the 
following articles show that people remaining in FFS plans use more care then those in 
HMOs, especially with regard to inpatient care.  Most of these studies demonstrate that 
people in FFS service plans use not only more outpatient care, but also more inpatient 
care.  While often overlooked, it is important to understand the magnitude between 
inpatient and outpatient costs.  People will often make more outpatient visits per year 
than inpatient, but the cost of a single inpatient visit could equal the cost of 100 
outpatient visits.71  If it could be identified why people select the health care plans they 
do and anticipate the type of care they plan on receiving (inpatient vice outpatient), this 
could lead to policy changes that may allow the government to control health care costs.  
The first article that supports the self-selection theory is from the Journal of the 
American Medical Association in 1983.  It outlines a study conducted in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Eleven employee groups covered by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield were given the opportunity to leave the FFS plan they were enrolled in to join an 
HMO.  For inpatient care, measured in days per thousand members each year, the group 
that selected to join the HMO plan used 53 percent less inpatient care than the group that 
remained in the FFS plan.  Even when the data were controlled for age, the differences 
remained.  People who remained in the FFS used 61 percent more inpatient days in the 
age group younger then 30 years; 77 percent more in the 30 to 39 years age group; 143 
percent more in the 40 to 49 years age group; 145 percent more in the 50 to 59 years age 
group; and 61 percent more for individuals ages 60 years and greater.  The results of this 
study indicate that proportionally large numbers of younger and lower users of health 
care enrolled in HMOs.72
The second article discusses findings of a study conducted by researchers at the 
University of Geneva, Switzerland, in October 1995.  The researchers examined factors 
 
71 Robert Wacloff,  (1990). Health Care Self-Selection in a Multiple Option Corporate Benefit 
Program. Submitted to the Whitaker College of Health Sciences and Technology in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Health Policy and Management at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p. 22.  
72 Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, John Kleinman,  (1983). Evidence of Self-Selection Among Health 
Maintenance Organization Enrollees. Journal of the American Medical Association, 250(20), pp. 2826-
2828.  
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affecting choice between managed care organizations (MCO) and FFS health insurance 
plans.  They distributed questionnaires to the members of both plans to compare the 
individuals that stayed with the FFS plan to those who opted for the MCO.  They found 
that the people remaining in the FFS plan tended to be women, have annual incomes 
greater than 75,000 Swiss francs, have a personal physician, and have consulted a 
specialist or used unconventional medicine in the past year.  People remaining in the FFS 
plan also made more health care visits than MCO enrollees (14.6 versus 9.1 per year).  
The choice of health plan was influenced by socio-demographic characteristics, previous 
patterns of health service utilization, and health status.73  
The final article discusses the findings of two professors at the Melbourne 
Business School, University of Melbourne, Australia.  Australia’s health care system has 
both public (Medicare) and private health insurance.  Even with Medicare, some 
households self-select to private health systems.  In Australia’s health care system, 
private hospitals do not accept public health insurance, and so you can only go to a 
private hospital or doctor if you have private insurance.  Households favor private 
insurance plans because they avoid the wait times associated with the public system for 
non-emergency care.  Private hospitals offer a higher level of hospital service including 
private rooms and a choice of doctors.  The types of people choosing private care are 
generally those who can afford it.  Since private care is of a higher quality, private 
insurance better insures against health risk.  Therefore, private health insurance also 
attracts those with a higher potential of becoming sick and needing care.  The professors 
do point out that self-selection is not necessarily bad for society, since people who chose 
private health care over public care are actually helping the public system by reducing 
congestion and expense for the country.74  
 
 
73 Jean-Francois Etter, Thomas Perneger, Andre Rougemont,  (1995). Self-selection of enrollers at the 
creation of a managed care organization, The European Journal of Public Health, 5(3), pp 157-162. 
 
74 Joshua Gans, Stephen King,  (2004). System Blocks Better Health Care. Australian Financial Review. 
Retrieved March 8, 2006, from Melbourne Business School database. Website: 
http://www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/papers/afrhealth.htm
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C. ANALYSIS INDICATING SELF-SELECTION 
 
1. Inpatient Usage 
As mentioned before, initial analysis indicated that Tricare Standard enrollees 
utilized inpatient health care at a far higher rate than Tricare Prime enrollees.  Again, this 
seemed unusual considering Standard enrollees face higher out of pocket expenses for 
care.  The analysis of usage was conducted in the following manner. 
To find civilian inpatient usage, data from Appendix G: Purchased Care Inpatient 
Admissions were used.  Standard usage was indicated by ACV code Z and the total 
number of admissions for 2005 was calculated for each bencat.  The total number of 
admissions was then divided by the total number of enrollees in that bencat, which gave 
admissions per person for 2005.  The summary of findings is in Table 4. 
Calculating MTF inpatient care usage was conducted in a similar manner and the 
data were taken from Appendix H: Direct Care Inpatient Dispositions.  For each bencat, 
pure Prime enrollees were identified by ACV codes A, B, E, F, H, J and Q.  Total 
dispositions per bencat were divided by the number of enrollees, which gave dispositions 
per person for 2005. 
 
2. Outpatient Usage 
Calculations for Standard enrollee usage are less accurate than calculated for 
inpatient usage due to our having less-than-exact data for civilian outpatient usage.  Since 
outpatient care is not separate by ACV code, advice from operators of the Military Health 
System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) was used to distinguish Standard 
enrollees.  The system operators indicated that Standard enrollees could be distinguished 
by the Enrollment Status codes of FS, T, and Y.  The total number of visits per bencat 
was then divided by the total number of enrollees in that bencat to give visits per person. 
Determining visits per person for MTF outpatient care was even less specific than 
calculating civilian outpatient care.  Since those data did not include ACV codes or 
Enrollment Status codes, we needed to make an assumption before calculations could be 
made.  The assumption was that Standard enrollees did not seek outpatient care at an 
MTF in 2005 because they had made the decision to enroll in a plan that allowed them to 
receive civilian care.  This allowed us to subtract out Standard enrollees from the rest of 
the population in each bencat.  We then took the total number of encounters per bencat 
and divided them by the population of that bencat less Standard enrollees. 
 










Civilian Care Inpatient 
(Admissions per enrollee) 0.31 0.72 0.59
Tricare Prime
MTF Inpatient (Dispositions 
per enrollee) 0.05 0.03 0.02
Tricare Standard
Civilian Care Outpatient 
(Visits per enrollee) 2.6 10.2 9.7
All Non-Standard
MTF Outpatient (Encounters 
per enrollee) 4.9 8.4 3.2  
 
3. Potential Causes of High Usage 
As indicated in Table 4, usage of inpatient care by Standard enrollees is 
significantly higher than that of their Tricare Prime counterparts.  Our literature review 
discussed some characteristics of people who chose FFS plans or less expensive HMO 
plans.  The University of Geneva study found that women, people with high incomes, and 
people with histories of high medical care usage gravitated to FFS plans.  The Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield study clearly demonstrated that individuals in FFS health care plans have 
higher usage rates than individuals in HMO plans.  And finally the article on the 
Australian health system indicates that people may be attracted to private care due to the 
services offered, such as a private room for inpatient stays and the opportunity to see the 
same doctor for all care. 
Many of these reasons may demonstrate why Standard enrollees use more care.  
Looking at the percentage of enrollees in each bencat may help with this analysis.  Close 
to 21 percent of active duty dependents are enrolled in Tricare Standard.  The percentage 
is much higher with retirees, where 71 percent are enrolled in Standard, and 66 percent of 
retiree dependents, survivors, and others. 
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Income was addressed as a factor for people remaining in FFS service plans.  As 
stated by the RAND study, health care is income inelastic (0 to 0.2).  The positive sign 
shows that as income increases, the demand for health care also increases.  Our analysis 
agrees with this when looking at the percentage of bencat 2 and 3 members that are 
enrolled in Standard.  Retirees should be financially secure considering the benefits 
received as a military retiree.  After 20 years of service, a retiree may be as young as 38 
years of age and is entitled to 50 percent of his base salary, adjusted for inflation each 
year, for the rest of his life.  Making the assumption that most retirees at this age will 
continue to work in the civilian world for potentially another 25 years, we feel safe in 
assuming they are financially secure.  On the other hand, personnel who have been in the 
military for only a short time are still young and not as financially secure as a retired 
person.  This would explain why only 21 percent of active duty dependents are enrolled 
in Standard.  These younger personnel probably consider themselves to be healthy, which 
studies show would make them more attracted to the cheaper HMO health plan. 
Services may be another reason people are attracted to Standard.  Standard 
enrollees can chose the doctor they want to see.  With care in the MTF, the doctor on call 
at the hospital is the one that provides the care, and so you may end up seeing a different 
doctor with each visit.  Some people feel more comfortable seeing the same doctor during 
each visit.  Also, with inpatient care at an MTF, the chances of receiving a private room 
are significantly less than at a civilian hospital.  The ability to see the same doctor may 
explain why 21 percent of active duty dependents enroll in Standard.  Pregnant women 
may be attracted to Standard since they will be able to see the same doctor for the 10 
months leading up to the birth of their child. 
Finally, a history of high medical care usage could explain the Standard enrollee 
usage rates.  Older personnel will consume more care on average than younger personnel.  
Since members of bencats 2 and 3 are older on average then members of bencats 1 and 4, 
their medical situations most likely require more care.  Bencat 2 and 3 members would 
therefore qualify as having a history of higher medical care usage.   
In conclusion, the enrollees of Tricare Standard have many of the same 
characteristics as people identified in other studies that are self-selecting health care 
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plans.  These characteristics include a history of high medical usage, high incomes, and 
attraction to services.  Therefore, we are confident that self-selection is occurring among 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the previous chapters, the history of the military health care system and how 
the system has evolved over the past decade were discussed.  As a result of our research 
we can conclude that the military health care system provides an incredible benefit to 
those eligible to use the system.  The main thrust of why the system changed over the 
years was an effort to control costs, but each time it missed its mark and failed to 
accomplish that goal.  Our research also indicates the phenomenon known as self-
selection is occurring among the beneficiaries using the system. 
The military health care system provides a tremendous amount of care to its 
beneficiaries.  The military health care system is responsible for maintaining the health of 
America’s fighting force as well as many other individuals eligible to use the system.  To 
accommodate this demand, the system uses state-of-the-art medicine and highly trained 
personnel to provide high quality care to its beneficiaries. 
DoD has always focused on providing quality health care to all active duty 
members, their dependents, retirees and their dependents, and survivors.  Quality is not 
DoD’s only focus, though.  It also strives to ensure easy access for all eligible members.  
DoD provides this access through a network of military hospitals located in most major 
military concentration areas throughout the world.  Unfortunately, congestion became 
such an issue at military facilities that DoD created a priority system to ensure active duty 
members were seen first.  This caused dependents and retirees to wait longer for care.  To 
prevent this waiting, DoD created CHAMPUS, and later the Tricare program.  These 
programs aimed to alleviate congestion by increasing access to medical care at private 
sector hospitals or military medical facilities.  These programs provided flexibility and 
convenient access to quality health care. 
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Providing convenient access was only one feature of the benefit.  DoD also 
ensures the military health care system keeps the cost of care artificially low to the 
consumer.  Treatment is virtually free at MTFs, as is most care provided through the 
Tricare Prime option, the military’s HMO health care plan.  Even those members enrolled 
in Tricare Standard, the military’s FFS health care plan, are afforded low cost shares 
when compared to private sector plans for the same coverage despite having the ability to 
seek care from civilian doctors.  No Tricare program has a premium associated with it, 
and only a few plans have cost shares in the form of co-payments or deductibles. 
Access plus low cost to the consumer are the factors that have prevented the 
military health care system from achieving its goal of controlling cost.  Achieving that 
goal will remain elusive as long as the emphasis is on maintaining easy access to care.  A 
study of the CHAMPUS system demonstrated that on an individual basis, care provided 
through an MTF is cheaper than the same care provided through CHAMPUS.  However, 
DoD decided not to eliminate CHAMPUS because it believed that increasing the capacity 
of the military health care system would only draw in “ghost beneficiaries” that were 
currently receiving care outside the system.  Instead, DoD decided to provide 
beneficiaries even greater ability to access care through the Tricare program.  Tricare 
offers three plans for accessing care, and since it acts like an HMO, the anticipated 
outcome was that it would contain costs.  What resulted however is a system that 
provides a huge incentive to consume medical care without much concern for the cost of 
that care. 
But maybe eliminating CHAMPUS would not have had the affect DoD expected. 
DoD assumed increasing capacity at the MTFs would bring in “ghost beneficiaries” who 
had already decided not to use the MTF system.  Yet, what if the assumption behind 
keeping CHAMPUS was incorrect?  It does seem like a reasonable assumption 
considering the laws of supply and demand.  If the military health system expands its 
capacity, it could provide more free care to the system’s beneficiaries.  A decrease in 
price of care, especially making it free, should raise the demand for that care.  However, 
could it be possible that other factors would have affected the decision of people to return 
to the MTF system? 
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We believe there are other factors involved in making the decision whether or not 
to receive care at an MTF.  It should be remembered that people who were using 
CHAMPUS had chosen to not accept free medical care at a MTF in the first place.  
CHAMPUS had costs associated with it, so using it made people decide whether the 
medical care they would receive was worth the cost.  Keeping this in mind, we believe 
the government may have not taken into account the population’s ability to self-select the 
care it wants.  Analysis of the current FFS program in use, Tricare Standard, 
demonstrates self-selection is still occurring. 
Enrollees in Tricare Standard are consuming care at a much higher rate than 
Tricare Prime enrollees.  Our conclusion is that this is occurring due to self-selection.  
Standard enrollees are making a decision to pay for care so they can have a choice in 
where that care is received.  Studies show that there are some common characteristics of 
people who will forgo cheaper, more restrictive plans and maintain more flexible, higher 
cost plans.  Factors causing people to pay for care instead of taking free military care 
include having a higher income, having a previous history of high medical care usage, 
and having an attraction to the perceived better services offered by civilian doctors.  
These findings may help DoD develop policies that could help contain costs for 
the military health care system.  Again, Tricare Standard enrollees consume medical care 
at a much higher rate than their counterparts in Tricare Prime.  Special attention is 
warranted due to the fact they consume more inpatient care, which is extremely more 
expensive than outpatient care.  Since it seems important for Standard enrollees to pay for 
care received from civilian doctors, this care must be of higher value to them than the 
fees imposed by Tricare.  The value of that care is different for everyone.  Nevertheless, 
by increasing the cost share for Standard enrollees, this could reduce the amount of care 
they demand, or at least have them share a larger burden of the health care costs they 
create. 
The military health care system could capitalize on the self-selection finding.  If 
the Tricare system were eliminated, most beneficiaries would continue to receive care at 
MTFs as they had done in the past.  Standard enrollees would be forced to make the 
decision on whether to return to the MTF system or seek medical care from somewhere  
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else.  While some Standard enrollees would return to the system, others would not.  This 
would allow the military health system to shed people who use large quantities of 
expensive care. 
 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Rising health care costs are one of the major issues facing this nation.  It affects 
every person, whether in the private sector or those employed by DoD and eligible to use 
the military health care system.  For DoD, the factors affecting rising costs are changes in 
accrual budgeting, beneficiary population size and general increases in health care costs.  
It is this latter factor that contributes the largest increase to health care costs for DoD and 
the private sector.  Interestingly, the private sector has tackled this problem differently 
than DoD. 
The private sector adjusted to the rise in medical costs by shifting these costs to 
the consumer through higher deductible plans, higher co-payments and higher premiums.    
DoD has decided not to address the problem.  It has kept costs low while increasing 
access to care.  This method has caused the government to currently spend about 55 cents 
for every dollar in wages on medical care, which is much higher than the private sector.  
If real efforts to control costs are not implemented, the amount DoD will spend on health 
care for each member in 2020 will equal the amount spent on wages under the worst-case 
scenario. 
Our initial objective to calculate the deadweight loss could not be achieved 
because the cost data are not properly categorized and wait time surveys do not exist for 
the military medical system.  Had these data existed, they would have allowed us to 
calculate an average cost per person, which is crucial to calculating the deadweight loss.  
However, our efforts were not without merit.  Our analysis of the data from the Military 
Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) indicates that self-
selection is occurring within the military health care system.  Active duty dependents, 
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retirees and their dependents, and survivors are consuming more care under Tricare FFS 
plan even though they are paying more for it. 
Since DoD keeps the cost shares very low for members who consume care 
through the FFS plan, these members have the incentive to consume more of it.  Our 
recommendation for DoD is to use our findings and develop policies that shift the 
increasing costs in national health care to those beneficiaries who consume the most 
health care within the DoD system, namely dependents of active duty personnel, retirees 
and their dependents, and survivors.  Since we have shown that individuals who consume 
large amounts of health care are willing to pay more for it, then DoD should shift more 
cost to them.  The magnitude of savings from such a policy change could be analyzed in 
future research. 
 
C. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Our research project has determined that Standard enrollees are self-selecting 
higher cost medical plans for some of the same reasons as people outside the military 
health care system. Armed with this knowledge, DoD should encourage further research 
into areas that compliment this work.  These areas should focus on identifying metrics 
that will allow DoD to find inefficiencies in the military medical system.    
As discussed previously, DoD’s own cost and usage tracking system did not 
provide sufficient data to calculate the deadweight loss to the military health care system 
by increasing co-payments and deductibles.  If cost to the consumer were increased, the 
quantity of care demanded should decrease which would reduce inefficiency caused by 
over consumption.   
In order to calculate the deadweight loss, factors that relate to price, quantity 
demanded, and price elasticity of demand must be known.  This study provided 
information on elasticity of demand for medical care as well as the quantity of health care 
supplied by MTFs and Tricare.  However, two studies should be undertaken to determine 
the unknown variables needed for calculating deadweight loss.  The first is to conduct 
 60
wait time studies at various military medical facilities in an effort to determine how long 
consumers wait for care once they get to an MTF or military hospital.  This information 
would be useful in understanding the quantity demanded for health care and could help 
understand some of the self-selection phenomenon seen in this study.  The second area 
that should be studied further is ascertaining true costs for outpatient visits.  Inpatient 
visit costs are categorized by beneficiary category and alternate care values.  However, 
outpatient visits under Prime and Standard plans are not categorized by ACV, and so true 
cost by beneficiary category cannot be determined.   
If the information contained in this work is combined with the research specified 
above, DoD may be able to modify current policies which would allow it to maintain cost 
while maintaining access.  Every person in the United States would like to have 
inexpensive health care at his/her disposal and DoD provides this benefit at a price that is 
lower than the average in the private sector.  Unfortunately, this benefit is hampering 
DoD’s ability to recapitalize and modernize its weapon arsenals.  DoD has the largest 
discretionary funds in the government’s budget and these funds are constantly being 
chipped away by other demands specified by Congress.  Also, personnel and its attendant 
benefits have become such an expensive item in the DoD budget, that the Air Force and 
Navy have started major personnel reduction programs feeling that they are the surest 
way to big cost savings; at a point personnel and benefits may become so expensive that 
DoD may seek to reduce personnel levels below that necessary to provide efficient “back 
office” force sustainment.  Controlling costs is getting more and more important and this 
is why these other proposed research topics should be undertaken. 
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A. AREA COVERED BY TRICARE REGION NORTH 
Connecticut Michigan Vermont
Delaware New Hampshire Virginia
Indiana New Jersey West Virginia
Illinois New York Wisconsin
Kentucky North Carolina Dist. Of Columbia
Maine Ohio Some Zip Codes of:
Maryland Pennsylvania        Iowa
Massachussetts Rhode Island        Missouri
       Tennessee
CONUS North Region
 
Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
 
B. AREA COVERED BY TRICARE REGION SOUTH 
Alabama Louisiana South Carolina
Arkansas Mississippi Tennessee
Florida Oklahoma Texas
Kentucky:  Fort Campbell area
CONUS South Region
 
Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
 





Nevada New Mexico North Dakota
Oregon Washinton South Dakota




Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
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D. AREA COVERED IN OVERSEAS REGIONS 
Pacific Region: Hawaii Canada
Western Pacific
Europe Region: Africa Latin America Region: Panama







Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
 
E. ITEMS NOT COVERED BY TRICARE 
Acupuncture Learning Disabilities
Anabolic Steroids Mind Expanision or Elective Psychotherapy
Artificial Insemination Naturopaths
Autopsy Services Orthodontia
Birth Control Orthotics, Orthopedic Shoes, and Arch Supports
Bone Marrow Transplants for Treatment of Ovarian Cancer Orthomolecular Psychiatric Therapy
Camps Over-the-counter Drugs
Christian Science "Absent Treatment" Private Hospital Rooms
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Rest Cure
Cosmetic Drugs Retirement Homes
Counseling Services Self-help Help Courses
Custodial Care Sex Changes
Education or Training Smoking Cessation Products
Electrolysis Speech Therapy
Experimental Procedures Sexual Dysfunction or Inadquacy Treatment
Family-furnished Care or Supplies Surgical Sterilization Reversals
Food, Food Subsititutes or Supplements Telephone Services or Advice
Foot Care Unproven Services or Care
Hearing Exams Vitamins - Except for Formulations of Folic Acid, Niacin, and Vitamins D, K, and B12
Immune Globulin Weight Control
Investigational Drugs Workers' Compensation
Medical Review
What's Not Covered by Tricare
 
Source: From Tricare Handbook (February 2006) 
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F. BREAKDOWN OF PRESONNEL BY ACV AND BENCAT CODE 
Beneficiary 
Category 4 1 1 3 3 4 1 4 3 2
ACV




















IGR - Inactive 
Guard/Reserve OTH - Other RET - Retiree
Grand 
Total
A - AD Prime 879,677 13 7 11 145,602 3 216 1,322 110 1,026,961




Prime AD 5,536 291 1 5,828
E - TRICARE 
Prime, 
CHAMPUS 
Eligible 2,009 1,525,488 213,982 807,410 43,323 3,003 10,920 7,216 8,681 466,668 3,088,700






Eligible 1 5,465 1,060 3 1 6,530
G - TRICARE 
Plus 
w/Standard 
CHAMPUS 20 1,282 114 57,726 26,627 2 1 21 80,680 166,473
H - TRICARE 
Overseas 
Prime AD 192,784 3 4,113 6 95 13 197,014




Eligible 147 161,730 5,139 17 89 13 20 5 167,160
L - TRICARE 
Plus, w/o 
Standard 
CHAMPUS 1,001 39 920 464 996 3,420
M - AD not 
reported as 
enrolled 227,566 126,771 354,337
Q - AD 
enrolled to OP 
Forces 147,124 4,532 151,656
U - Uniformed 
Services 
Federal Health 
Plan USFHP 16 9,954 4,589 36,531 8,541 33 631 170 98 32,766 93,329
Z - Not 
enrolled in an 
alternate care 
program/unkn
own 245,727 195,412 1,474,211 442,289 74,200 56,461 45,961 1,406,750 3,941,011
R - TRICARE 
Reserve 
Select 1 7 2 6,201 3,105 9,316
Grand Total 1,454,880 1,950,664 420,349 2,376,828 521,244 284,439 91,969 67,174 56,200 1,987,988 9,211,735 
 
Source: After Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) 
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Total Amt OHI, Total
Amt Patient Paid, 
Overall, Total
Amount Allowed, 
Total Amount Paid, Total
1 S AA 936.96 3,726.47 $45,639.36 $31,546.87 $4,780,048.21 $4,649,692.47
1 S Y 1,075.79 3,870.80 $249,148.29 $42,344.30 $4,434,472.48 $3,885,694.74
1 Z FE 21.27 526.15 $166,935.83 $256.56 $255,357.13 $81,442.25
1 Z FS 5,180.17 57,579.51 $44,584,766.51 $95,805.23 $126,422,218.66 $6,958,095.20
1 Z SN 522.34 2,500.16 $24,291.11 $0.00 $3,175,960.96 $3,167,638.78
1 Z SO 110.02 402.53 $2,711.90 $0.00 $498,206.97 $495,035.05
1 Z SR 204.84 1,153.43 $0.00 $77.00 $1,022,061.56 $1,016,944.94
1 Z ST 7.01 11.02 $0.00 $905.26 $10,097.50 $9,192.24
1 Z T 69,914.09 308,137.18 $53,199,604.91 $3,708,037.62 $318,238,042.37 $249,600,181.94
1 Z V 82,607.42 305,580.43 $58,832,854.36 $3,618,076.39 $285,179,771.91 $242,476,454.23
1 Z W 23.31 170.22 $0.00 $0.00 $165,525.51 $165,525.51
1 Z X 10.2 45.92 $0.00 $40.52 $79,153.02 $40,898.83
1 F WO 836.81 2,187.73 $20,610.85 $26.93 $2,890,805.59 $2,754,601.26
1 J XF 28,108.70 127,338.50 $706,466.10 $233,022.55 $88,034,297.53 $84,405,421.20
1 D BB 9 82 $0.00 $894.00 $43,125.63 $42,231.63
1 E U 405,507.17 1,484,383.67 $40,462,691.16 $6,342,541.45 $1,311,505,827.96 $1,253,995,510.44
1 E WF 22,102.23 77,751.32 $7,371,029.39 $283,759.85 $102,221,053.08 $94,054,362.39
1 E Z 387,948.33 1,720,978.50 $58,584,483.04 $11,794,308.36 $1,863,471,860.35 $1,778,424,684.36
2 S AA 6.1 85.2 $0.00 $2,902.45 $165,296.38 $159,911.09
2 S Y 6.07 29.3 $18,539.86 $2,904.34 $21,695.17 $7,008.76
2 W TS 49 414 $524,013.92 $110,421.08 $494,803.63 $15,005.66
2 Z FE 3,278.17 75,513.96 $12,110,264.92 $2,747,903.22 $53,492,074.30 $33,313,383.66
2 Z FS 765,040.23 6,168,599.31 $6,837,331,666.40 $6,579,827.25 $14,912,508,282.48 $805,467,005.04
2 Z SN 102.22 1,536.30 $32,161.94 $5,076.54 $2,543,973.90 $2,515,362.81
2 Z SO 65.42 901.95 $13,441.01 $0.00 $975,368.84 $964,523.43
2 Z SR 68.24 844.88 $7,249.29 $0.00 $860,636.78 $852,298.88
2 Z T 128,729.10 806,084.29 $563,552,892.29 $106,600,155.11 $1,296,445,399.16 $526,935,394.60
2 Z V 117,016.01 605,652.94 $530,589,098.59 $70,633,502.97 $852,459,720.09 $459,129,792.99
2 Z W 4.17 74.57 $0.00 $0.00 $18,120.27 $18,120.27
2 Z X 2.02 36.44 $0.00 $6.70 $55,492.54 $1,484.88
2 J XF 1.01 5.06 $0.00 $0.00 $2,129.83 $2,129.83
2 D BB 4,353.00 42,039.00 $272,648.76 $314,808.66 $39,925,110.91 $39,394,896.89
2 E U 70,275.67 388,164.92 $89,252,346.95 $5,323,383.96 $636,524,116.54 $493,801,953.53
2 E Z 82,490.08 536,480.65 $136,781,923.18 $6,179,569.95 $806,401,768.40 $621,335,950.72
3 S AA 437.83 1,970.61 $155,452.53 $159,964.80 $2,022,197.08 $1,737,934.70
3 S Y 516.45 2,847.62 $153,130.58 $269,214.78 $3,678,327.51 $3,205,920.58
3 W TS 48 170 $241,398.37 $32,847.62 $183,277.26 $6,731.47
3 Z FE 2,736.58 70,096.63 $11,807,141.39 $2,153,475.49 $39,436,675.95 $21,515,178.87
3 Z FS 733,962.60 6,447,655.43 $5,794,674,859.03 $4,285,285.43 $12,632,876,162.39 $769,739,052.09
3 Z PS 1.01 3.04 $4,066.46 $0.00 $4,508.82 $887.11
3 Z SN 147.35 852.55 $27,446.78 $99.31 $1,263,671.03 $1,243,129.35
3 Z SO 84.69 438.13 $2,594.70 $0.00 $504,265.17 $486,990.71
3 Z SR 62.69 340.62 $13,242.48 $0.00 $421,546.25 $395,224.23
3 Z ST 9.04 48.11 $0.00 $1,551.43 $53,252.12 $51,700.69
3 Z T 214,203.38 1,268,231.10 $630,063,816.16 $168,030,742.32 $1,648,439,739.97 $759,746,203.35
3 Z V 209,787.39 1,099,018.08 $586,269,080.17 $111,337,905.59 $1,188,412,808.47 $711,038,409.52
3 Z W 2.05 26.85 $0.00 $0.00 $64,486.85 $64,486.85
3 Z X 2.07 2.13 $0.00 $10.62 $3,617.99 $3,607.37
3 J XF 19.23 122.44 $1,422.92 $0.00 $110,216.13 $107,313.99
3 D BB 3,455.00 35,681.00 $182,286.73 $264,099.93 $28,129,365.31 $27,614,488.03
3 E U 133,638.45 709,985.29 $98,875,663.28 $10,675,911.96 $870,302,698.49 $708,379,604.54
3 E WF 24.68 221.67 $25,423.85 $1,292.45 $155,113.02 $116,705.27
3 E Z 132,936.32 859,347.59 $154,267,212.69 $12,925,960.24 $999,135,869.26 $785,909,885.32
4 B WA 1,600.20 4,500.37 $0.00 $0.00 $4,061,670.39 $4,039,298.47
4 H X 29,681.46 102,968.49 $28,831.02 $0.00 $64,207,496.79 $63,519,182.74
4 H XF 1.02 0 $0.00 $0.00 $432.47 $432.47
4 A U 1.3 21.66 $0.00 $0.00 $4,789.69 $4,789.69
4 A W 16,652.08 60,838.83 $387,359.75 $570.70 $89,304,673.48 $89,064,068.16
4 A Z 8.18 89.31 $29,335.62 $0.00 $85,078.39 $73,023.87
4 M AA 91.39 250.44 $0.00 $3,281.48 $281,443.68 $238,313.90
4 M SN 58,225.53 259,548.78 $336,140.54 $7,434.16 $326,408,838.67 $325,714,650.77
4 M SO 1,089.81 8,839.35 $14,160.34 $0.00 $13,590,734.20 $13,543,563.60
4 M SR 80,832.13 339,176.72 $133,885.74 $2,075.52 $433,356,120.41 $433,119,675.84
4 M ST 1,215.36 4,871.17 $6,420.45 $0.00 $4,387,925.98 $4,365,881.43
4 M T 341.13 1,717.50 $917.60 $4,136.13 $1,836,143.72 $1,822,354.53
4 M V 25.56 95.11 $579.68 $1,253.97 $94,070.66 $86,410.77
4 M Y 172.13 780.46 $20,260.75 $8,393.60 $978,413.27 $928,356.91
4 Q SN 168.8 899.75 $0.00 $0.00 $1,320,491.95 $1,320,491.95
4 Q SO 1.01 16.18 $0.00 $0.00 $80,567.97 $80,567.97
4 Q SR 2,753.89 15,577.67 $0.00 $0.00 $24,893,796.96 $24,859,589.80
4 Q ST 1.01 2.03 $0.00 $0.00 $1,472.10 $1,472.10
4 Q T 13.24 47.87 $0.00 $0.00 $130,973.94 $130,973.94  
 
Source: After Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) 
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H. SELECTED DIRECT CARE INPATIENT ADMISSIONS 
FY
Ben Cat 





Total Variable Cost, Total Full Cost, Total
2005 1 Overseas B N 2 $3,679.84 $4,595.17
2005 1 Overseas F N 56.48 $541,497.32 $708,669.64
2005 1 Overseas H N 153.36 $773,713.57 $1,010,100.54
2005 1 Overseas J A 3 $11,494.86 $16,910.50
2005 1 Overseas J C 4 $31,287.61 $39,258.47
2005 1 Overseas J N 10,169.60 $51,008,380.31 $67,237,129.73
2005 1 Prime A N 732.76 $2,923,577.16 $3,942,156.62
2005 1 Prime E A 142.64 $988,265.10 $1,262,672.07
2005 1 Prime E C 410.99 $3,416,243.86 $4,364,712.19
2005 1 Prime E N 80,586.33 $347,362,624.56 $459,418,263.72
2005 2 Overseas H N 1 $2,749.22 $3,413.69
2005 2 Prime A N 18.18 $114,265.17 $145,631.21
2005 2 Prime E A 11.05 $137,439.11 $172,130.54
2005 2 Prime E C 1,538.46 $16,098,610.64 $20,364,698.04
2005 2 Prime E N 12,344.18 $105,974,434.91 $134,797,598.08
2005 2 Reliant Q N 1 $3,953.86 $4,990.23
2005 3 Overseas F N 1 $16,875.18 $22,286.35
2005 3 Overseas H N 8.01 $35,610.28 $47,658.84
2005 3 Overseas J N 7.05 $42,834.23 $56,591.98
2005 3 Prime A N 62.58 $341,737.38 $448,174.84
2005 3 Prime E A 20.11 $156,525.56 $195,725.43
2005 3 Prime E C 1,340.79 $10,738,989.08 $13,722,077.21
2005 3 Prime E N 18,311.77 $129,946,024.23 $166,780,636.86
2005 3 Reliant Q N 1 $68,061.94 $85,872.46  
 
Source: After Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) 
 
 













Total Amt OHI, Total
Amt Patient 
Deductible, Total
Amt Patient Paid, 
Overall, Total
1 Other FS 182,401 $54,245,443.40 $7,420,525.07 $30,881,170.07 $133,995.05 $219,516.89
1 Other T 1,127,607 $164,144,006.09 $109,171,509.24 $31,063,493.37 $10,681,972.99 $28,371,287.82
1 Other Y 9,716 $2,175,730.67 $1,852,603.74 $63,133.45 $121,372.11 $292,216.84
2 Other FS 12,399,215 $4,523,601,141.69 $597,575,912.92 $2,457,629,643.28 $9,196,229.98 $15,248,090.91
2 Other T 1,898,849 $484,539,655.91 $175,281,660.73 $244,573,587.25 $20,773,062.82 $65,254,302.88
2 Other Y 5 $869.52 $492.15 $0.00 $213.36 $377.41
3 Other FS 14,775,207 $4,386,008,684.24 $595,661,413.34 $2,376,757,624.43 $11,873,634.36 $18,436,316.90
3 Other T 4,337,669 $859,261,321.11 $368,848,392.48 $375,019,731.58 $41,440,879.24 $136,578,768.33
3 Other Y 14,084 $2,729,223.55 $2,129,062.65 $106,516.42 $159,450.96 $536,854.25  
Source: After Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) 
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Total Variable Cost Total Full Cost, Total
1 Desig Prov A 1 $356.47 $447.69
1 Desig Prov C 10 $2,397.46 $3,129.44
1 Desig Prov N 1654 $291,588.75 $377,043.70
1 Other A 3276 $689,429.30 $893,980.06
1 Other C 4916 $1,031,819.78 $1,327,922.12
1 Other N 633449 $103,851,156.51 $133,521,298.49
1 Overseas A 381 $65,686.62 $84,846.50
1 Overseas C 828 $154,460.80 $196,399.15
1 Overseas N 1010792 $186,571,282.68 $240,584,925.70
1 Plus A 1240 $239,802.27 $302,641.23
1 Plus C 4508 $922,576.87 $1,187,221.84
1 Plus N 22142 $4,333,729.08 $5,736,906.21
1 Prime A 8827 $1,579,520.32 $2,012,675.22
1 Prime C 23116 $4,546,184.47 $5,815,173.22
1 Prime N 7767202 $1,262,996,021.45 $1,613,539,179.27
1 Reliant N 2653 $390,693.95 $502,433.95
2 Desig Prov A 28 $4,391.29 $5,877.20
2 Desig Prov C 412 $90,442.05 $119,961.06
2 Desig Prov N 817 $140,340.84 $183,484.72
2 Other A 10312 $2,306,741.96 $2,985,820.70
2 Other C 187167 $40,921,530.08 $52,826,483.19
2 Other N 229470 $50,343,607.35 $64,966,843.26
2 Overseas A 1 $1,454.76 $2,129.66
2 Overseas N 317 $54,048.58 $68,708.83
2 Plus A 13749 $3,139,460.33 $4,043,936.89
2 Plus C 636993 $138,988,483.95 $177,340,108.23
2 Plus N 228887 $52,765,050.98 $68,139,090.48
2 Prime A 655 $124,519.35 $157,559.75
2 Prime C 77088 $16,606,620.51 $21,044,683.77
2 Prime N 1758124 $363,214,310.55 $461,439,387.58
2 Reliant N 688 $134,451.85 $173,745.18
3 Desig Prov A 12 $1,665.15 $2,108.99
3 Desig Prov C 139 $25,547.20 $33,032.11
3 Desig Prov N 915 $149,241.05 $192,657.13
3 Other A 7160 $1,673,793.76 $2,157,077.95
3 Other C 136459 $28,396,616.37 $36,488,372.11
3 Other N 1008210 $177,560,449.51 $230,082,543.12
3 Overseas C 12 $1,985.07 $2,455.04
3 Overseas N 1901 $345,135.12 $450,574.86
3 Plus A 11886 $2,438,096.60 $3,135,540.01
3 Plus C 600579 $121,950,139.94 $155,114,298.67
3 Plus N 217804 $46,414,549.33 $60,176,403.16
3 Prime A 869 $166,110.49 $211,765.05
3 Prime C 91232 $18,385,135.56 $23,263,473.46
3 Prime N 2775774 $525,984,134.89 $668,295,566.73
3 Reliant N 9466 $1,458,981.53 $1,858,564.16  
Source: After Military Health System Management Analysis and Reporting Tool (M2) 
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K. DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORY VALUES 
Value Meaning
1 Dependent of Active Duty/Guard
2 Retired
3 Dep of Retired or Survivor, Other, Unknown
4 Active Duty and Guard
Value Meaning
A TRICARE Prime (Active Duty), (Note, this definition is not consistent with DEERS)
B TRICARE Global Remote Overseas Prime Active Duty
D TRICARE Senior Prime
E TRICARE Prime (Non- Active Duty)
F TRICARE Global Remote Overseas Prime Active Duty Family Member
H TRICARE Overseas Prime Active Duty
J TRICARE Overseas Prime Active Duty Family Member
M Supplemental Care and CHCBP (Active Duty)
Q AD enrolled to Op Forces
R TRICARE Reserve Select
S CHCBP enrolled
W TRICARE Senior Supplement Demonstration Program
Z All Others
Value Meaning
A CRI - Foundation Health Plan
AA Continued Health Care Benefit Plan (CHCBP) - Extra
B CRI - Partners Health Plan
BB TRICARE Senior Prime (Effective 10/01/1998 through 12/31/2001)
C CRI - Queen's Health Care Plan
D MCS TRICARE - Tidewater Standard Program
E MCS TRICARE - Tidewater Prime (Network Prov)
F Fiscal Intermediary (FI) Standard Program
FE TRICARE for Life - Extra (Effective 10/01/2001)
FS TRICARE for Life - Standard (Effective 10/01/2001)
G MCS TRICARE - Tidewater Extra
H MCS - Homestead, Enrolled Patient
I MCS - Homestead, NonEnrolled Patient, Network Provider
J MCS - Homestead, Standard Program
K MCS - CA/HI TRICARE Prime Enrolled Patient
L MCS - CA/HI NonEnrolled, Network Provider (TRICARE Extra)
M MCS - CA/HI Standard Program
N CRI - Not enrolled, Not Standard Program (Extra)
O New Orleans Prime
P New Orleans Not Enrolled, Not Standard CHAMPUS
PS TRICARE Senior Pharmacy (Effective 04/01/2001) 
Q New Orleans Coordinated Care Standard CHAMPUS Program
R TRICARE Extra-North Carolina
S CRI Standard Program
SN Supplemental Health Care Pgm - Non MTF Referred Care
SO Supplemental Health Care Pgm - Non TRICARE Eligible
SR Supplemental Health Care Pgm - Referred Care
ST Supplemental Health Care Pgm - TRICARE Eligible
SU
Supplemental Health Care Pgm - Referral designation (effective 3/1/2002) for non-inst 
pharmacy claims only.
T TRICARE Standard
TS TRICARE Senior Supplement Demonstration Program (Effective 04/01/2001)
U MCS-Prime Civilian PCM
V MCS-Extra
W TPR Active Duty Claims, USA
WA Foreign Remote ADSM (Effective 9/1/2003)
WF
TPR for Enrolled Active Duty Family Member Residing with a TPR Eligible Active Duty 
Service Member (Effective 09/01/2002)
WO Foreign Remote ADFM (Effective 9/1/2003)
X Active Duty Member Claims, Europe
XF Foreign Prime ADFM (Effective 9/1/2003)
Y Continued Health Care Benefit Program (CHCBP) - Standard
Z Managed Care support - Prime MTF/PCM
Alternate Care Value Data Values and Meanings
Common Beneficiary Category Data Values and Meanings
Enrollment Status Data Values and Meanings
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